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CRYPTO SECURITIES:
ON THE RISKS OF INVESTMENTS IN
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED ASSETS AND THE
DILEMMAS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
SHLOMIT AZGAD-TROMER*
Recent declarations and investigations by the Securities and Exchange
Commission suggest that blockchain-based assets are potentially subject to
regulation as securities under the Securities Act. This Article presents a
systematic analysis of the risks and embedded costs of investments in blockchainbased assets and assesses their potential regulation as securities.
This Article offers a comprehensive account of the pertinent properties of
blockchain-based assets, the technology of the blockchain, the markets available
for their trade, and their varied underlying sources of value. It identifies unique
costs and risk factors inherent to the blockchain technology, and examines
whether securities laws can potentially add value and protect investors from
these unique risks. Identified costs and risks factors include controlling costs
prevalent even in decentralized ledgers, monitoring costs that vary according to
the costs of automatic verification, technology risks rooted in the vulnerability of
the blockchain to bugs in its software, and systemic risks embedded in limited
transparency and contractual rigidity of the blockchain-based investment contract.
This Article examines these unique costs and risk factors and assesses their
normative implications for securities regulation of blockchain-based assets.
With current efforts by regulatory authorities to designate blockchain-based assets
as securities, a coherent approach is presented based on the type of the offering,
investors’ profile, and the technical and legal contours of the blockchain-based
* Associate Research Scholar, Columbia Law School. Thanks for helpful comments
and conversations go to Mike Burstein, Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Geeyoung Min, and to
participants of the Law and Entrepreneurship Retreat at Alabama Law School, the
Roundtable discussion at Fordham Center on Law and Information Policy, and the
Associates Seminar at Columbia Law School. Special thanks to Eran Tromer, for decades
of thought-provoking and fruitful conversations, including the inspiration for this paper.
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asset under assessment. The analysis proposes that securities regulators should
target the identified costs and risk factors and assess the potential of securities
regulation to protect investors, based on a structural and technical assessment
of the blockchain-based asset under consideration and as balanced against the
costs of securities regulation. The proposed approach is illustrated by examining
several blockchain-based assets, including Bitcoin, Tezos, and Filecoin.
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INTRODUCTION
The technology underlying blockchains has revolutionized
financing of entrepreneurial businesses.1 According to a report by
Forbes, investments in blockchain platforms exceeded venture capital
investments in the first half of 2017, attracting the participation of
banks, big tech firms, and startups.2 With the aggregate global crypto
market capitalization exceeding $300 billion, investments in blockchain
offerings have become the hottest trend in contemporary finance.3
Recent declarations and investigations by the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) infer that blockchainbased assets are subject to regulation as securities,4 suggesting that
token and cryptocurrency offerings without registration are violating
the Securities Act,5 thus marking a critical juncture for the blockchain

1. See Alex Tapscott & Don Tapscott, How Blockchain is Changing Finance, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/how-blockchain-is-changing-finance
(identifying blockchain as a solution for the inefficiencies in the financial system).
2. See Chance Barnett, Inside the Meteoric Rise of ICOs, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2017, 1:21
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2017/09/23/inside-the-meteoricrise-of-icos (“Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”) have quickly grown to account for more
startup funding in blockchain-based companies than all of Venture Capital.”).
3. See Nate Nead, Cryptocurrency & Blockchain Market Capitalization, Opportunities and
Risks, INV. BANK, https://investmentbank.com/crypto-market-cap (last visited Oct. 17,
2018) (noting the global crypto market cap, the rise of the industry, and its significance
in monetary policy).
4. In July 2017, the SEC published a report of an investigation pursuant to § 21(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regarding an offering of the blockchain
proposed by the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO). Report of
Investigation Pursuant to § 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO,
Exchange Act Release No. 81207, at 1–2 (July 25, 2017). The DAO report determined
that in this case, tokens offered in a blockchain were considered securities under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 1.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012).
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industry and its regulation.6 According to the Securities Act, investment
contracts whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of others are considered
securities.7 Securities afford investors broad protection and impose
exhaustive requirements on their offerors, including, but not limited to,
mandatory disclosure.8 Different transactional approaches were suggested
6. In December 2017, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton made a public declaration
regarding the blockchain “buzz” in financial markets, raising concerns about the
industry’s rapid growth. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement
on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 (noting that amidst rapid growth
“[a] number of concerns have been raised regarding the cryptocurrency and ICO
markets”). In January 2018, Chairman Clayton addressed the potential regulation of
ICOs as securities in his opening remarks at the Securities Regulation Institute, stating
that “[t]he SEC is undertaking significant efforts to educate the public that unregistered
securities investments offered by unregistered promoters, with no securities lawyers or
accountants on the scene, are, in a word, dangerous.” Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 22,
2018). In an op-ed published in January 2018, both the chairman of the SEC and the
chairman of the Commodity and Futures Trading Commission voiced concern about the
blockchain industry and expressed a commitment to addressing this emerging market.
See Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are Looking at Cryptocurrency, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-are-looking-atcryptocurrency-1516836363 (expressing concern that cryptocurrencies largely operate
outside of the existing regulatory sphere and noting “[t]he SEC is devoting a significant
portion of its resources to the ICO market”).
In November 2017, Stanford professor and former SEC commissioner Joseph
Grundfest told the New York Times that “ICOs represent the most pervasive, open and
notorious violation of securities laws since the Code of Hammurabi.” Nathaniel Popper,
Initial Coin Offerings Horrify a Former S.E.C. Regulator, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/26/business/initial-coin-offering-critic.html.
On November 1, 2017, the SEC announced that endorsement by “[c]elebrities and
others . . . using social media networks to encourage the public to purchase stocks and
other investments . . . may be unlawful if they do not disclose the nature, source, and
amount of any compensation paid . . . by the company in exchange for the
endorsement.” SEC Division of Enforcement & SEC Off. of Compliance Inspections &
Examinations, SEC Statement Urging Caution Around Celebrity Backed ICOs, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statem
ent-potentially-unlawful-promotion-icos; see also Hester M. Pierce, Comm’r, SEC,
Beaches and Bitcoin: Remarks Before the Medici Conference (May 2, 2018) (noting the
regulatory regime imposed on tokens or coins used in ICOs will shape the industry).
7. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
8. See id. at 298 (stating the term “investment contract” originally implied that a
level of protection was granted to investors); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 680 (1984)
(explaining the limitations on and many requirements of firms resulting from
mandatory disclosure rules in the securities industry). See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
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to hedge the regulatory uncertainty in the blockchain industry due to
the SEC’s declarations.9 But why should blockchain-based assets be
considered securities to begin with?
This Article proposes a systematic analysis of this question utilizing a
thorough analysis of the core costs and risk factors embedded in
blockchain-based investments. This Article’s central claim is that
blockchain-based assets have heterogeneous technical characteristics
and transactional structures. Therefore, the applicability of securities
laws to blockchain-based asset offerings requires evaluating the risks
underlying the investment—whether investors can be left to fend for
themselves given their financial profile and the nature of such risks,
and whether securities laws can potentially mitigate these embedded
costs and risk factors and add value to investors.
This Article describes the contours of crypto investment contracts,
the blockchain technology, and the markets for blockchain offerings.
Part I identifies the structural heterogeneity of blockchain offerings in
their varied sources of underlying values, language and corporate
forms, technical feasibilities, marketing venues, and voice and exit
rights granted to their holders. Unbundling the constitutive elements
of blockchain offerings allows a better understanding of the emerging
technology for investment contracts and a thorough analysis of its
potential securities regulation.
Part II then identifies unique costs and risk factors underlying the
blockchain-based investment contract. This Article is the first to identify
controlling costs, monitoring costs, and systemic risks stemming from
the blockchain territory.
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2017). Whether tokens,
blockchain units, and cryptocurrencies are securities is also relevant to the legal space
in which these web-based exchanges operate. Under § 5 of the Exchange Act, it is
“unlawful for any broker, dealer, or exchange . . . to effect any transaction in a security,
or to report [it], unless such exchange (1) is registered as [a] national securities
exchange,” unless an exemption applies. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2012).
9. Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale
Framework 15–21 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-ProjectWhitepaper.pdf (proposing a framework to “navigate the federal securities and moneytransmitter laws”). But see Not So Fast—Risks Related to the Use of a “SAFT” for Token Sales,
CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT 1 (Nov. 21, 2017) [hereinafter CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN
PROJECT] (cautioning that the SAFT framework “may create more problems than it
solves”). The SAFT is based on the Simple Agreement for Future Equity (SAFE), which
has long financed early stage companies. Batiz-Benet et al., supra note 9, at 15. In an
example of a SAFT transaction, investors would rely on Rule 506(c) of Regulation D
of the Securities Act and enter into an agreement with developers to exchange $15
million for tokens through a four-step process. Id. at 16.
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Part III reviews the theoretical justifications for securities regulation
and considers their application to blockchain-investments. The
descriptive analysis of the blockchain-based asset is merged with
theoretical justifications of securities regulations, explaining why and
when crypto-markets fail to protect investors and regulation is
warranted. The analysis sheds light on the adequacy of securities
regulation of blockchain offerings, while also providing an important
case study for analysis of core theoretical questions in securities laws,
their purpose, the breadth of their application in different types of
markets, and their regulatory exclusivity.
Part IV evaluates types of policies that can be effective in protecting
investors from identified sources of risk while facilitating effective
functioning of crypto markets and thereby encouraging technological
and financial innovation.
The analysis shows that blockchain’s new investor interface sometimes
replaces the need for securities regulation, providing an automated
platform that mitigates the traditional risks of investments and establishes
trust based on computation protocols. There are also instances in which
the emerging blockchain technology heightens the need for regulating
crypto offerings: when the blockchain technology impedes transparency,
increases risk, and compromises investors’ protection. Understanding
the technical and legal differences between various blockchain offerings
is key to assessing their potential securities regulation.
The focal point of the discussion assessing the applicability of
securities laws to investment contracts is the Supreme Court’s opinion
in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. (Howey),10 as recently applied by the SEC to
the blockchain paradigm in the case of The Decentralized
Autonomous Organization (DAO) offering.11 According to the Howey
opinion, investors’ motivation for profits and their reliance on the
efforts of others to accumulate profits is the litmus test of a security.12
This Article shows that blockchain-based assets call into question the
rationality of this doctrine. Reliance on others is an unfit legal test for a
decentralized platform, where investors rely on a global community of very
many others, none of whom are particularly well-suited to carry the costs of
mandatory disclosure. The purchaser motivation test unnecessarily
increases regulatory uncertainty looming over the blockchain industry, as
purchaser motivation is rarely free of profit aspirations in the blockchain
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11. See infra Section IV.A.2.
12. See infra Section IV.A.1.
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territory.13 Additionally, the monitoring costs underlying blockchain-based
assets representing consumptive values are often higher, warranting better
investor protection, contrary to the Howey prescription.
Once the sources of risk are identified, it can be inferred when
securities regulation may add value and protect investors. When
controlling costs, monitoring costs, and systemic risks, inter alia,
outweigh the costs of regulation on a blockchain-based asset, securities
regulation may be warranted. Drawing on literature from “antifraud
only” governance for institutions in the growing 144(a) market,14 the
case is made for analogous public policy allowing sophisticated
investors secondary trading with substantial liquidity in blockchain
transactions, largely free from securities regulations.15 Finally, this
Article surveys other ways that regulators may address risks of
investment in blockchain-based assets, whether supplementing
securities laws or as alternative regulatory baskets.

13. The costs of uncertainty in the blockchain industry are profound. See Peter
Van Valkenburgh, Principles for Clarifying SEC Jurisdiction over Cryptocurrencies and ICOs,
COIN CTR. (May 24, 2018), https://coincenter.org/entry/principles-for-clarifying-secjurisdiction-over-cryptocurrencies-and-icos (arguing that the flexibility of the Howey
test harms innovation and makes the United States “an unfriendly home for earnest
technologists whose activities are not fraud and do not pose undue risks to investors,”
and makes the secondary cryptocurrencies markets “unnecessarily fraught” as there is
large uncertainty as to whether all tokens—or only a select few—are securities).
14. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2018); COX ET AL., supra note 8, at 379–80
(explaining that Rule 144A “sets forth a non-exclusive safe harbor from the
registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act for the resale of restricted
securities”); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CAL. L. REV. 279, 285 (2000) (referring to sophisticated investors as “issuer-level
investors” and proposing that “securities of issuers that deal solely with issuer-level
investors . . . face no mandatory regulations”); C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated
Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1144 (1988) (“[W]hen
only sophisticated investors generally purchase a type of instrument, courts are more
likely to consider that instrument not a ‘security.’”); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth
of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 409, 417 (2008).
15. The case for such a private market is weighted against expected political hurdles,
including the motivation of securities regulators to police the financial powers emerging
on the blockchain, implicitly imposing such norms as accountability and transparency
on the libertarian sphere of the blockchain, largely detached from the monetary
governance of the state. See generally Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in
International Securities Regulation, 2 Theoretical Inq. L. 387, 393–94 (2001). Cf. Donald
C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets,
95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (2009) (questioning whether the SEC should be tasked with
regulating the increasingly global and technical financial marketplace).
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I. THE PROPERTIES OF BLOCKCHAIN-BASED ASSETS
This Section provides a factual background for analyzing
blockchain-based assets as securities.
The technology of the
blockchain is introduced, shedding light on the heterogeneous
technical applications of blockchain-based assets, the varied entry costs
for their offerors, and the open code vulnerabilities, including
consensus protocols and blockchain “forks.” The different sources of
values attached to blockchain-based assets are elaborated, introducing
the concepts of “utility tokens” versus “investment tokens,” and the
substantial value attributed to the size of their user networks.
Marketing venues of blockchain-based assets are reviewed. Finally, this
Section surveys the language used by blockchain-based investment
contracts, the diversity of their corporate forms, the language of the
blockchain investment contract, and the exit and voice rights
conferred upon blockchain investors.
A. The Technology
The blockchain-based assets discussed in this Article are
technologically embedded in a ledger in which all transactions are
maintained by a network of nodes (computers) that coordinate to
maintain and extend its content. The generic term “blockchain-based
assets” is used to refer to virtual assets where issuance and ownership
are defined by blockchains—or “cryptocurrency coins” and “tokens,”
in the blockchain industry’s terminology.
The ledger consists of a sequence of records, each representing a
transaction with precisely defined format and semantics.16 These
transactions are in virtual assets associated with the blockchain and
may represent the issuance of new units of such assets, transfer of
ownership in such units, or more generally a specification for how
certain units of the assets will be automatically allocated under
specified conditions of a so-called “smart contract.”17
A ledger implemented by a blockchain can be decentralized or
centralized18 and “permissioned” or “permissionless”—i.e., requires or does

16. The ledger compiles documents together in a tree structure (a chain) and timestamps
each document/transaction as it is appended. See ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND
CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION XX–XXI (2016).
17. A “smart contract” is defined as “an agreement whose execution is automated.”
Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 309 (2017).
18. An example of a decentralized system is Bitcoin, which “has no central points
of control, and uses a novel peer-to-peer network protocol to agree on a distributed
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not require permission to read and add transaction records.19 In a
centralized ledger, one party or organization, runs the software on the
blockchain and exclusively controls the database embedded in its ledger.20
In a decentralized ledger, the computation and maintenance are run on
network nodes that are dispersed and no single party controls the network.21
Another property of blockchain is the permission to read and to
write on the ledger: defining the agents allowed to issue new
transactions and the agents allowed to read the content of transactions
already recorded in the ledger. In a permissionless ledger, any party
can post new valid transactions for inclusion in future blocks using the
consensus protocol, and any party is allowed to read all past
transactions.22 The validity of a transaction depends on its content—
e.g., the transaction does not create funds out of thin air in violation
of the protocol, and transfer of ownership in the blockchain-based
asset is authorized by a digital signature of the previous owner—but
does not depend on the identity of the party that transmits the
transaction.23 Conversely, in a permissioned ledger, addition and/or
reading of transaction records can be done only by specific designated
parties.24 In general, permission has to with content of the blockchain,
ledger of transactions.” CHELSEA BARABAS ET AL., MIT MEDIA LAB, Defending internet
Freedom Through Decentralization: Back to the Future? 1 (2017). Most of today’s prominent
blockchains are decentralized, e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litecoin.
19. Ramesh Gopinath, Checking the Ledger: Permissioned vs. Permissionless Blockchains,
IBM THINK BLOG (July 28, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/think/2016/07/
checking-the-ledger-permissioned-vs-permissionless-blockchains (arguing that permissioned
blockchains are preferable to permissionless blockchains because they promote economic
activity and efficiency, reduce potential for disputes, and are more easily regulated).
20. Taulant Ramabaja, On Centralized vs Decentralized Ledgers, BITSAPPHIRE (Feb. 12,
2015), https://bitsapphire.com/on-centralized-vs-decentralized-ledgers (noting the
general belief that the Internet, Bitcoin, and other evolving technologies could cripple
the system of central powers controlling networks).
21. See Heidi Hecht, Decentralization vs Centralization, CRYPTO BRIEFING,
https://cryptobriefing.com/decentralization-vs-centralization (last updated Aug. 25, 2018)
(noting that with decentralization “there’s no centralized third party controlling [] platforms”).
22. See Permissioned vs Permissionless Ledgers, 1KOSMOS BLOCKID (June 5, 2018),
https://onekosmos.com/blog/permissioned-blockchain-vs-permissionless-ledgers
(“Permissionless blockchains . . . [are] open for anyone to participate [in] . . . and
have open-source code that their community maintains.”).
23. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
24. Permissioned ledgers are of interest mainly in business-to-business and
enterprise applications. Cf. Sloane Brakeville & Bhargav Perepa, Blockchain Basics:
Introduction to Distributed Ledgers, IMB:
DEVELOPERWORKS (Mar. 18, 2018),
https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/cloud/library/cl-blockchain-basics-introbluemix-trs (stating that “industrial-grade blockchain technologies” should be
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and centralization has to do with its platform, or technical
infrastructure. To illustrate, it may be useful to a consider an analogy
to a radio program, centralized through the radio station’s broadcast.
The sportscast would be considered permissioned, while the request
show inviting listeners to call-in would be permissionless.
Ownership of blockchain-based assets is authoritatively defined by
the transactions recorded in the current version of the ledger.25 The
ledger keeps evolving as new transactions are appended.26 Parties that
wish to view or add to the ledger run a designated computational
protocol, embedded in computer software, which communicates with
other such parties to establish a consistent view of the blockchain.27
The process of obtaining a consistent ledger in a decentralized,
permissionless blockchain is based on a consensus protocol.28
Numerous nodes communicate by a designated “consensus protocol”
to vote on which updates to embed into the ledger, aiming to make
the ledger resilient to opportunistic intervention, manipulation, and
censorship. The nodes that participate in this consensus protocol are
termed “miners.”29 The decision on the contents of the new block
cannot be made by naïve voting among miners due to the threat of
“Sybil” attacks where a single party masquerades as numerous nodes.30
permissioned). Blockchain platforms designed for permission ledgers include
Hyperledger Fabric and R3 Corda. See MARTIN VALENTA & PHILIPP SANDNER, FRANKFURT
SCH. BLOCKCHAIN CTR., Comparison of Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric and Corda 2 (2017),
http://explore-ip.com/2017_Comparison-of-Ethereum-Hyperledger-Corda.pdf
(identifying Hyperledger Fabric and R3 Corda as “[p]ermissioned, private” ledgers).
25. Amy Castor, A (Short) Guide to Blockchain Consensus Protocols, COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/short-guide-blockchain-consensus-protocols (last updated
May 17, 2017, 5:11 PM) (explaining the significance of a “consensus algorithm”).
26. For example, with Bitcoin, “a new block is appended to the blockchain every 10
minutes, through mining.” Blockchain, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/b/blockchain.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
27. See Castor, supra note 25 (explaining various methods of proving the veracity
of the ledger).
28. See Introduction, HYPERLEDGER FABRIC, https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs
.io/en/release-1.2/blockchain.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (explaining how
consensus operates in a decentralized blockchain ledger for Hyperledger Fabric v1.2).
29. See Noelle Acheson, How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK, https://www.coin
desk.com/information/how-bitcoin-mining-works (last updated Jan. 29, 2018)
(explaining “nodes” and which types constitute “miners”).
30. “A Sybil attack . . . occurs when a hacker presents many different identities and
manipulates the blockchain to the hacker’s benefit.” Jane Susskind, Comment,
Decrypting Democracy: Incentivizing Blockchain Voting Technology for an Improved Election
System, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 785, 814 (2017) (citing Michael Abramowicz, CryptocurrencyBased Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 386–90 (2016)).
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Thus, consensus protocols use weighted voting, where the weight of a
miner’s vote, relative to other miners, depends on some measure of
resource investment. Details vary, but currently, most blockchains rely
on “proof-of-work,” where votes are effectively weighed according to
the amount of computational effort spent solving mathematical
puzzles.31 Thus, in a decentralized blockchain, miners are not equal
in their control, but are given equal terms that can, at the miners’
discretion, acquire control by ad hoc resource consumption and/or
capital investment. In Bitcoin (BTC), for example, the consensus
protocol is based on a proof-of-work requirement that is essentially a
collateral of computational power.32 Bitcoin’s consensus protocol
chooses a particular node in the network and makes it the “king” of
the new block, granting it the exclusive power to assign and allocate
ownership in the new block, subject to compliance with the node’s
requirements.33 The winning node is not chosen at random.34 Bitcoin
applies a proof-of-work mechanism that is based on solving a
mathematical puzzle.35 For every new block, a new puzzle is created,
and the first node to solve that puzzle will get the privilege of allocating
the property rights within the new block.36 The number of blocks one
previously runs or owns, and the number of nodes one possesses, are
therefore irrelevant regarding the ability to generate new nodes. The
power to assign and allocate property rights on Bitcoin’s blockchain is
thus a function of the computational power one has.37

31. Proof-of-work essentially measures the computer hardware capital and energy
(for running and cooling the computers) that were dedicated to mining. See Castor,
supra note 25 (explaining the proof-of-work process). Emerging alternative approaches
include, inter alia, proof-of-space (measuring capital in the form of computer storage
resources that is dedicated to mining) and proof-of-stake (consisting of capital in the
form of blockchain-based assets that is locked up for the duration of mining).
32. See Bitcoin Developer Guide, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/developerguide#proof-of-work (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (explaining how a greater degree of
computational work is essentially imposed on “untrustworthy” actors as a way to
regulate the Bitcoin market).
33. Cf. Acheson, supra note 29 (explaining nodes, miners, hash functions, and how
Bitcoin generally works).
34. See id. (explaining the process through which miners compete to solve the
winning number in the hash function in exchange for 12.5 bitcoins, which was roughly
worth $200,000).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Andrew Tar, Proof-of-Work, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/explained/proof-of-work-explained (“What matters is to
have large computational power to solve puzzles and form new blocks.”).
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Computational power entails significant costs, including computer
equipment subject to depreciation,38 electricity costs to run the
computers, and cooling costs of the heat generated by the computers.39
Both electricity costs and cooling costs are consumable goods. These
costs function as quasi-collateral. As an incentive to parties to invest
such computational effort and apply it to the blockchain’s network,
some blockchains assign a mining fee.40 In Bitcoin, the mining fee is
predetermined by a formula according to a fee schedule and transaction
fees are collected from holders of allocated units in the designated
block.41 In theory, any node can participate in the bidding process on
computational power.42 In practice, however, the significant costs of
computational effort required leave a limited set of agents in the field,
creating a quasi-oligopoly of miners who employ large “mining farms”
with numerous servers dedicated to the process of bidding for new blocks,
often in rural and remote locations where electricity costs are lower and
cooling costs are naturally available due to weather conditions.43
38. Computer hardware typically needs to be replaced every two years to remain
competitive. Mark Kyrnin, Upgrade or Replace a Desktop PC?, LIFEWIRE (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.lifewire.com/upgrade-or-replace-desktop-pc-832712 (noting that “[t]he
average desktop PC has a functional lifespan of roughly three to eight years”).
39. See Aaron Hankin, Here’s How Much It Costs to Mine a Single Bitcoin in Your
Country, MARKETWATCH (May 11, 2018, 9:18 AM), https://www.marketwatch
.com/story/heres-how-much-it-costs-to-mine-a-single-bitcoin-in-your-country-2018-0306 (noting a study that indicated costs ranged from $531 to $26,170 per bitcoin mined
and that energy consumed worldwide mining bitcoins is equivalent to the Czech
Republic’s annual energy usage); Jordan Tuwiner, Is Bitcoin Mining Profitable or Worth
It in 2018?, BUY BITCOIN WORLDWIDE, https://www.buybitcoinworld wide.com
/mining/profitability (last updated June 30, 2018) (noting that “[o]nly those with
specialised [sic], high-powered machinery . . . are able to profitably extract bitcoins nowadays”
and that the difficulty of mining bitcoin has grown exponentially in recent years).
40. What is the Blockchain Fee?, WIREX, https://help.wirexapp.com/hc/enus/articles/212638865-What-is-the-blockchain-fee (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (noting
the mining fee “is collected to reward miners for maintaining the Bitcoin network”).
41. See Gautham, Bitcoin Miner Fees and Micropayment Channels, NEWSBTC (May 22,
2016, 9:30 PM), https://www.newsbtc.com/2016/05/22/bitcoin-miner-fee-andmicropayment-channels (explaining the “fee predictor” and small block size).
42. See Euny Hong, How Does Bitcoin Mining Work?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/how-does-bitcoin-mining-work (last updated July 2, 2018,
8:00 AM) (noting only computing power is needed, not math or computational skills).
43. See Morgen E. Peck, Why the Biggest Bitcoin Mines are in China, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct.
4, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/why-the-biggestbitcoin-mines-are-in-china (describing a large facility in Mongolia composed of 21,000
computers, and climate and energy costs as factors in determining the location of a mining
farm); Jordan Tuwiner, Bitcoin Mining Pools, BUY BITCOIN WORLDWIDE,
https://www.buybitcoinworldwide.com/mining/pools (last updated June 30, 2018)
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Most blockchains are implemented by open source software,
distributed under licenses that allow copying and modification.44
Modifications to the software may continue obeying the same
consensus rules, and thus agree with the original software about what
is the authoritative version of the ledger and what asset ownership it
reflects.45 Conversely, modifications may change these rules, thereby
inducing a “fork” of the chain, where parties using the old software see
one version of the transaction history and parties using the new
software see a different version.46 For example, if specific transactions
in the ledger are deemed unpalatable by some parties, then it is
technically feasible and legally permissible to fork the blockchain into
a new one, which is similar to the original except that those specific
transactions are nullified—and any user of the blockchain who chooses
to upgrade its software would accordingly view a different transaction
history on the ledger.47 A fork may also be created to upgrade the
blockchain for better performance or functionality,48 or to launch a
competing blockchain and capture market share.49
(describing various mining pools and stating they “are groups of cooperating miners who
agree to share block rewards in proportion to their contributed mining hash power”).
44. See Demian Stauber, Spotlight on Copyright Issues of Blockchain Technology, FRORIEP
(Sept. 21, 2017, 2:45 PM), https://blog.froriep.com/en/spotlight-on-copyright-issuesof-blockchain-technology (noting that “[m]ost public known blockchain projects are
open source,” which means their software allows for free redistribution and
modification permissions).
45. See Amy Castor, A Short Guide to Bitcoin Forks, COINDESK, https://www.coin
desk.com/short-guide-bitcoin-forks-explained (last updated May 16, 2017, 9:05 PM)
(explaining “soft forks” and how new transactions may still appear valid to nonupgraded nodes).
46. For a history of consensus forks on Bitcoin, see A Complete History of Bitcoin’s Consensus
Forks, BITMEX (Dec. 28, 2017), https://blog.bitmex.com/bitcoins-consensus-forks.
47. This is the case, for example, in the Ethereum/Ethereum Classic fork, intended
to nullify specific fraudulent transactions in the DAO. See infra Section III.E (DAO fork).
48. For example, consider the fork between Bitcoin and Bitcoin-cash executed in
August 2016. The upgraded version of bitcoin incorporated SegWit, a protocol
enhancement designed to reduce the size of transaction records, was named Bitcoin,
while the original version became known as “bitcoin cash.” See Jacqui Frank et al., We
Just Got a Super Smart and Simple Explanation of What a Bitcoin Fork Actually Is, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 1, 2017, 4:02 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-fork-explainedgold-segwit-segwit2x-cash-the-bit-3-2017-10; Making Bitcoin Work Better, THE ECONOMIST
(July 29, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/07/29/
making-bitcoin-work-better. Interestingly, the branding of different forks of the
blockchain is decided ad-hoc by market forces and eco-system politics.
49. See Jake Smith, The Bitcoin Cash Hard Fork Will Show Us Which Coin Is Best, FORTUNE
(Aug. 11, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/11/bitcoin-cash-hard-fork-price-date-why
(noting the split allowed for competition and assuaged fears by some of centralization).
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Some blockchains support the ad hoc creation of new asset types.
Most notably, Ethereum supports the creation of “ERC-20 tokens,”
which are new asset types that can be transacted on the Ethereum
blockchain—in addition to, and separately from, the native “ether”
blockchain-based asset (ETH).50 Anyone can create such a token and
set the token supply and distribution rules at their discretion.51 The
technical implementation of such tokens—e.g., the consensus protocol
and supporting software—is mostly provided by the underlying, preexisting Ethereum blockchain platform.52 This creates a very low barrier
to entry for creation of new blockchain-based assets that are simple
tokens without an independent blockchain.53
Blockchain technology has thus established:
(1) The means of creating virtual assets—“tokens,” or
“cryptocurrencies”—and assigning such assets an underlying value
implemented via code, contract, collateral, etc.54
(2) A quantitative methodology for allocating ownership in these virtual
assets and representing it publicly on a ledger, analogous to a registry of
deeds.55
(3) A platform for trade in these virtual assets, conveniently and
efficiently, in exchange for Bitcoins, Ether (ETH), or other
cryptocurrencies, all easily exchangeable for U.S. dollars (USD) and
other major international currencies on the web.56

50. Nathan Reiff, What is ERC-20 and What Does it Mean for Ethereum?, INVESTOPEDIA (June
20, 2017, 9:36 AM), https://www.investopedia.com/news/what-erc20-and-what-does-it-meanethereum (explaining ERC-20 and Ethereum, and distinguishing them from ether).
51. See id. (noting ERC-20’s impact on developers and that new tokens released by
developers “have by-and-large observed the ERC-20 rules”).
52. See id. (listing six different functions that ERC-20 defines).
53. See James Cheo, Why Blockchain is Real and Bitcoin is a Mirage, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2017,
11:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insideasia/2017/12/10/why-blockchain-is-realand-bitcoin-is-a-mirage (noting the aggregate infiniteness of cryptocurrencies and the low
barrier to entry regarding creation of new cryptocurrencies).
54. See id. (commenting that Bitcoin is a multi-billion dollar virtual asset, and
explaining blockchain and its potentially wide-ranging applications).
55. See id. (“A blockchain is essentially a distributed database of records or public
ledger of all transactions that have been executed and shared among participating
parties. Each transaction in the public ledger is verified by consensus—a majority of
the participants in the system.”).
56. See, e.g., About, KRAKEN BITCOIN EXCHANGE, https://www.kraken.com/enus/about (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (explaining how Kraken allows users to exchange
Bitcoin for European Union, Canadian, American, British, or Japanese currencies).
Whether blockchain-based assets are securities is also relevant to the legal space in
which these web-based exchanges operate. Under § 5 of the Exchange Act, it is

2018]

CRYPTO SECURITIES

83

When the supply of assets created by this technology meets demand,
a market is established.
B. The Market
Notably, many blockchain-based assets are not offered to the public in
the primary market.57 For example, Bitcoin was released as an open source
software, submitting to a decentralized mining process shortly after a white
paper was published describing its concept.58 The period between the
launch of the blockchain-based asset and the public release of its code is
often referred to as a pre-mining period, giving entrepreneurs a period of
privileged mining with lower costs and no competition.59
Tokens or cryptocurrencies may be offered to the public, typically, in a
process entitled an initial coin offering (ICO), alluding to initial public
offering (IPO) of securities in the traditional market place.60 ICOs raise
capital through allocation of blockchain units and are often accompanied
by a public relations campaign, aimed to raise a specific target of funding

unlawful to engage in any transaction in a security not registered on a national
exchange, unless an exemption applies. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2012). An “exchange” is
defined as “any organization, association, or group of persons [which] . . . provides a
market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities.”
§ 78c(a)(1). Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(a) provides a functional test to assess whether
a trading system meets the definition of exchange under § 3(a)(1): “[a]n
organization, association, or group of persons shall be considered” an exchange if it
“(1) [b]rings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers; and
(2) [u]ses established, non-discretionary methods . . . under which such orders
interact with each other . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a) (2017). This rule excludes
systems that merely “[r]oute[] orders to” other execution facilities. Id. § 240.3b16(b)(1). One such exemption is the Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs), defined by
Rule 300(a) of Regulation ATS, which exempts platforms that do not “[s]et rules
governing the conduct of subscribers other than the conduct of such subscribers’
trading on such [ATSs]” or “[d]isciplines subscribers other than by exclusion from
trading.” Id. § 242.300(a)(2).
57. See, e.g., Michael Scott, Private Capital Market Ecosystems Meet the Blockchain,
BITCOIN MAG. (June 6, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/privatecapital-market-ecosystems-meet-blockchain (describing “an agreement to build an
alternative investment marketplace for closed-end funds utilizing [blockchain]”).
58. See infra Section IV.D.1 (providing a detailed analysis of Bitcoin).
59. For a discussion of pre-mining, see Antonio Madeira, What is a Premine?,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (May 20, 2018), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/
what-is-a-premine.
60. The Meaning in the Madness of Initial Coin Offerings, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 9,
2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/11/09/the-meaning-in-the-mad
ness-of-initial-coin-offerings (describing ICOs as “a form of crowdfunding” where coins
are exchanged for payment).
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and bounded in a particular time frame for the offering.61 Many ICOs are
accompanied by a white paper or a “plan,” describing the merits of the
proposed investment offer, although officially the contractual language is
embedded in the consensus algorithm (or the smart contract), and the
white paper subordinates to the code’s terms.62
One key distinction between crypto markets and traditional capital
markets is the original number of units offered for sale. In traditional
capital markets, the number of units offered is explicitly stated in the
offering memoranda. For example, an IPO is an offering of a fixed number
of shares to be sold.63 Trade in secondary markets is therefore capped to
the fixed amount of securities available. In crypto markets, on the other
hand, the number of units is constantly growing through an on-going
mining process.64 The original offer typically defines a “genesis block” that
sets the mining challenge and identifies the process for recreating future
blocks that are added to the blockchain.65 Some blockchains set a
maximum cap (“limited money supply” in the blockchain rhetoric), while
others have an endless continuum available for mining.66 Notably, in both
61. Initial Coin Offering (ICO), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/i/initial-coin-offering-ico.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) [hereinafter ICO]
(outlining the ICO process).
62. Id. See Cohney et al., infra note 96, at 6 (documenting a consistent “gap
between what ICOs promise and what their code delivers”).
63. Royce de Rohan Barondes, Correcting the Empirical Foundations of IPO-pricing
Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 437, 441–42 (2005) (providing background information
on the IPO process and describing the way in which IPOs are sold); see also Sham Gad,
How an IPO is Valued, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financialtheory/11/how-an-ipo-is-valued.asp (last updated Apr. 3, 2018, 10:23 AM) (noting the
price of a share is dependent upon its demand).
64. See Mining, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/32530/min
ing-blockchain (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (defining mining as “the process of adding
transactions to the large distributed public ledger of existing transactions, known as
the blockchain”).
65. A genesis block is the first block in the chain. See Genesis Block, BITCOIN WIKI,
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Genesis_block (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (noting that the
genesis block is special in that it does not reference a previous block and contains
“exactly all of the variables necessary to recreate the block”).
66. For a discussion of Bitcoin’s limited supply, see Controlled Supply, BITCOIN WIKI,
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply (last visited Oct. 17, 2018), which
provides that there will only be a finite number of bitcoins in existence because the
number of bitcoins created per block is set to decrease. Unlike Bitcoin, Ethereum
does not have a specific currency supply limit. See Ethereum Not Having a Supply Cap Is
Not Such a Big Deal, FINTECHIST, http://www.fintechist.com/ethereum-not-supply-capnot-big-deal (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). For a detailed comparison of Bitcoin and
Ethereum, see Bitcoin vs Ethereum: Where to Invest in the Next 10 Years?, CRYPTOCURRY,
http://cryptocurry.com/features/bitcoin-vs-ethereum-invest-next-10-years (last visited
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cases, the original offer does not encompass the entire holdings available
in blockchain-based assets, and these holdings are expected to continuously
grow with the mining process over time.
In the secondary market, trade in tokens and cryptocurrencies is
often conducted on web platforms that allow online market spaces for
forex, stocks, commodities, derivatives and indices. Examples for such
web-based exchange platforms include Gemini,67 Coinbase,68
CoinMarketCap,69 and AvaTrade.70 Yet the crypto secondary markets
are fundamentally different from traditional capital markets. The
traditional market-based antidotes—signaling, underwriter reputation,
and accountant or credit-rating certification—simply do not apply as
there are no underwriters, analysts, credit rating agencies, or
accountants in the crypto context. The sale is often automated so that
a smart contract is programmed to allocate tokens to third parties
immediately after payment has been received.71
There are no
intermediaries,72 and no systematic analyst coverage, other than emerging
crypto analyst firm Messari73 and occasional reviews by bloggers of
different backgrounds and views.
C. The Transaction
This section introduces the transactional structure of blockchainbased assets, drawing attention to the nature of the complexity
embedded in these innovative constructs. It examines the varied sources
of value embedded in blockchain-based assets, the language used for

Oct. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Bitcoin vs Ethereum] (describing the key differences between
Bitcoin and Ethereum, including the time to process blocks, the depth of their monetary
supply, the pricing of transactions, and the structure of their internal codes).
67. See GEMINI, https://gemini.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
68. See COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
69. See COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
70. See AVATRADE, http://www.avatrade.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
71. See Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain 8
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22952, 2018), http://www.nber.
org/papers/w22952.pdf (explaining that smart contracts are specific operations that
“can be automated in response to future events,” such as receiving payments from
third parties).
72. Id. at 6, 8–9 (clarifying that transactions in the crypto secondary markets utilize
blockchain technology instead of intermediaries).
73. About, MESSARI, https://messari.io/about (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (stating
that Messari’s mission is to “help[] researchers, investors, and regulators” make sense
of cryptocurrencies through an open data library and curation tools).
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blockchain-based contracts, the heterogeneous corporate forms used by
their developers, and the exit and voice rights given to their investors.
1.

Value
Blockchain transactions vary in their underlying sources of value.
Sometimes, the value of blockchain-based assets is intrinsic to the
blockchain itself—such value can be embedded in the blockchain’s
technological merit, in its software, and/or in the size of its user
network.74 Other blockchain-based assets represent values off their chain,
such as consumptive goods or services, often in entrepreneurial stages.75
Consider, for example, Bitcoin’s sources of value. Some of Bitcoin’s
value is derived out of its technological merit as a method for safe,
efficient, and fast transfer of financial value to anyone all over the
world.76 The expediency of value transfer in cryptocurrencies is
practically useful to merchants in globally spread supply chains,
compared with the traditional bank transfer of currencies abroad
which may take up to a week.77 On top of this practical value, the value
of Bitcoins is also derived from the size of its network of Bitcoin users
and its expected market value in the secondary market, due to its
growing reputation and expanded user network.78
74. Bitcoin is one example that may be considered to understand how the value of
blockchain-based assets is determined. See Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/b/bitcoin.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (stating that the price of
Bitcoin depends on the size of its mining network).
75. See infra notes 290–310 and accompanying text (discussing Tezos and Filecoin).
76. CHRIS BURNISKE & JACK TARTAR, CRYPTOASSETS: THE INNOVATIVE INVESTOR’S
GUIDE TO BITCOIN AND BEYOND 176 (2018). Cryptocurrencies offer an online system
for immediate transfer of value any date or time, whereas international financial
transactions can take days to process and are often subject to regulatory approval and
to the business hours of the financial intermediaries involved. Id.
77. Id.
78. Regarding Bitcoin, funds are not raised with the expectation that the
promoters will build their system and investors can earn a return on the instrument.
Rather, funds reflect the size of the network and the expectation to collect
accumulated returns based on the extension of such network. The core algorithm
remains unchanged. Cryptocurrencies and tokens often appreciate their value with
the extension of their respective user networks. An evaluation of bitcoin based on its
network of users has been suggested by Tom Lee. See Sara Silverstein, Analyst Says 94%
of Bitcoin’s Price Movement over the Past 4 Years can be Explained by One Equation, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2017, 9:51 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-pricemovement-explained-by-one-equation-fundstrat-tom-lee-metcalf-law-network-effect2017-10. Spencer Wheatley et al. show that the key measure of value for
cryptocurrencies is the network of people who use them by documenting a generalized
Metcalfe’s law describing the growth of the population of active bitcoin users, showing
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The network value of cryptocurrencies is sometimes called the
“Tinkerbell Effect,” alluding to the fictional world of Peter Pan.79
Tinkerbell exists only as long as one believes in her, and the value of
blockchain-based assets exists not because some central bank will serve
as a liquidity backstop, but because the size of their network of users
sustains a constant flow of demand in the secondary market, which
indirectly gives the blockchain-base assets market value.80 In that sense,
blockchain-based assets are similar to commodities, the value of which
is an aggregate sum of its practical value for the end user and its
network value, entrenched in the consumer perception of the
commodity within the social environment at which it is sold.81
Other blockchain units are contractually designed to represent value
in another product or service extrinsic to the blockchain.82 The plan
or white paper accompanying the offering often attaches underlying
initiatives to the blockchain so that allocation of blockchain units
represent respective ownership stakes in an asset, project, or business
initiative in the real economy.83 Often, such a project has not been
undertaken or even initiated at the time the ICO is carried out, and
the ICO is an entrepreneurial proposal that is yet to be materialized
and performed by the offeror or offerors. Examples include
that the generalized Metcalfe’s law provides a support level, and that the ratio of
market capitalization to “the Metcalfe value” gives a relative valuation ratio. Spencer
Wheatley et al., Are Bitcoin Bubbles Predictable? Combining a Generalized Metcalfe’s Law and
the LPPLS Model 2, 13–14 (Swiss Fin. Inst., Paper No. 18-22, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141050; see also How Network
Theory Predicts the Value of Bitcoin, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.tech
nologyreview.com/s/610614/how-network-theory-predicts-the-value-of-bitcoin.
79. For a discussion of the analogy between Bitcoin appreciation and the
Tinkerbell Effect, see NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 169.
80. Id.
81. For example, the value of gold is expected to appreciate with growth of its
social prestige and its public image as a luxury metal. See supra note 78 (discussing
Bitcoin valuation using Metcalfe’s law). A recent district court decision found in favor
for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and held that Bitcoin is a
commodity under the Commodities Exchange Act because of the way cryptocurrencies
store value and influence the economic behavior of users, as well as serving as a type
of monetary exchange. See CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 224–27 (E.D.N.Y.
2018).
82. See Bernard Marr, What Is The Difference Between Bitcoin and Ethereum?, FORBES
(Feb. 5, 2018, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/
05/what-is-the-difference-between-bitcoin-and-ethereum (explaining that Ethereum is
a blockchain-based asset that represents value in Ether, a type of crypto token).
83. For an example of a white paper that accompanies an offering, see infra note
304, which contains Filecoin’s white paper.
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entrepreneurial efforts and endeavors in a particular underlying
market, products, or services offered in such an extrinsic underlying
market, commodities, indices, and any other form of value.84
Blockchain-based assets that offer investors the opportunity to use or
to consume a valuable service are usually referred to as “utility tokens”
and are somewhat analogous to derivative contracts: one layer
representing the underlying value and the other representing the unit
of blockchain-based asset serving as its platform.85 Notably, “utility
tokens” can represent functional underlying value, such as a
commodity or a stake in revenues of an operating business, or other
sources of value in the real economy.86
However, from a contractual perspective, ICO documents often
disclaim any obligation to actually deliver their initiatives or perform
specific obligations towards the accomplishment of the proposal.87
Purchasers of tokens, or other blockchain units under an ICO, are thus
exposed to a very high counterparty risk, essentially trusting the offeror
to perform their obligations in the real economy; to expand the
network so as to raise the tokens’ value in the secondary market; and
to technically maintain the network so as to secure it against cyberattacks, hyper-dilution, and bugs in its code.88 These utility tokens are
84. For an illustration of the breadth of potential underlying values for blockchainbased assets, see BANANACOIN, https://bananacoin.io (last visited Oct. 17, 2018)
(demonstrating that the Bananacoin is pegged to the export price of one kilogram of
bananas). See Lionel Laurent, I’ve Seen the Blockchain’s Future. It’s Banana-Shaped,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/
2018-01-26/i-ve-seen-the-blockchain-s-future-it-s-banana-shaped
(exploring
how
crypto-assets can now be tied to “real-world value rather than mere abstraction”).
85. See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin
Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 11, 41, 44–45), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3048104 (emphasizing the “dual nature” of utility tokens by explaining how they
have both a practical use and a derived value that can be used as an investment opportunity).
86. For an overview of utility tokens, see CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT, supra note 9, at 2.
87. See Zetzsche et al., infra note 158, at 12, 17 (identifying the contractual risks
that ICO documents, such as white papers, pose).
88. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on
Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/ne
ws/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 (addressing several concerns about
the cryptocurrency markets and warning investors about the various risks associated with
ICOs); see also Nathan Reiff, ICOs Present Unique Legal Risk to Buyers and Sellers, INVESTOPEDIA
(Feb. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.investopedia .com/news/icos-present-unique-legalrisk-buyers-and-sellers (describing some of the risks created by ICOs—such as investors
“[struggling] with [offerors] that don’t follow through on their promises, and the potential
for hacks and fraud”).
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a method of raising initial “seed” funding for an entrepreneurial
project, at a point in time when the potential of the project is
uncertain, and the project may be abandoned by its entrepreneurs,
diluted by other investors, or experience any other material change to
its business plan, personnel, or underlying property. Typically, no
particular commitment is made by the offerors to dedicate their time
and efforts to the planned entrepreneurial project. According to a
recent study, “utility tokens represent the majority of tokens issued to
date.”89 Another recent study finds that less than 10 percent of the tokens
acquired by investors “can be put to use” while the rest are “merely
available for trading, indicating purely speculative instruments.”90
2.

Language and corporate forms
The legal terms of the blockchain transactions are rarely accessible
to the layman investor. The legally binding terms of the blockchainbased asset are embedded in its code (i.e., the computer software
defining its operation).91 Typically, but not necessarily, this code is
open source, and purchasers of tokens may view it prior to the
transaction.92 However, understanding the code requires significant
technical expertise and effort. The code is often written in a
programming language unique to the blockchain, requiring much
effort of experts literate in several programming languages.93 In
addition, offerors of the tokens usually produce a white paper or an
unofficial offering memorandum to accompany the offer as part of its
marketing efforts.94 Some other marketing initiatives accompany
blockchain offerings, including celebrity endorsements, banner
advertisements and other media and press releases, all of which are

89. CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT, supra note 9, at 2.
90. Zetzsche et al., infra note 158, at 18.
91. See Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C.
BANKING INST. 177, 181 (2017) (noting that the “actual agreement” for a blockchainbased asset “is embodied in computer code”).
92. See Tanaya Macheel, R3 Makes Code for Financial Agreements Platform Open Source,
AM. BANKER (Nov. 30, 2016, 9:21 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/r3makes-code-for-financial-agreements-platform-open-source (discussing one example
of a blockchain platform making its code open source).
93. See Blockchain Coding: The Many Different Languages You Need!, BLOCKGEEKS,
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/blockchain-coding (last visited Oct. 17, 2018)
(outlining how to code on a blockchain).
94. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
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directed at the general audience and provided in English.95 Purchasers
of blockchain-based assets are generally left to make their decision
based on the more accessible and comprehensible marketing materials
disseminated by the offerors. Often, these accompanying marketing
materials are not including solid contractual obligations of the offerors
but rather display their intent to proceed in entrepreneurial efforts as
described in the white paper “in future tenses.”96 Indeed, a recent
empirical survey of ICOs finds that there is constant gap between
contract and code, with significant differences documented between
the blockchain’s code and its accompanying white paper, suggesting
that code often falls short of contract in ICOs.97
Offers of blockchain units are initiated by groups of developers using
various corporate forms, including for-profits, non-profits, and
unincorporated organizations.98 Some developers use non-profits to
signal their societal commitment, characterizing the exchange of the
tokens as a donation for tax purposes.99 It is also not uncommon to see
developers offering blockchain units without incorporating at all, using
the blockchain itself as an alternative technological liability shield.100
3.

Exit and voice
While almost all blockchain units offer their holders a right to exit
and sell their holdings in the secondary markets, different blockchains
vary in the voice given to their holders.101
There is currently no uniform standard for the contents and form of
blockchain voting rights, leading to considerable heterogeneity
between different blockchains. In general, voting rights in the
blockchain rarely regard the appointment of agents or distributions,

95. For an example of the marketing efforts that accompany blockchain offerings,
see infra notes 292–294 and accompanying text, which highlight Tezos’s marketing
initiatives during its ICO.
96. Shaanan Cohney et al., Coin-Operated Capitalism, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 18), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3215345.
97. Id. at 6.
98. See infra Section IV.D (providing examples of the different groups offering
blockchain units).
99. See infra Section IV.D.2 (describing how Tezos’s ICO was designed as a
fundraiser for a non-profit organization).
100. The DAO, discussed in detail below, is one example of an unincorporated
organization offering tokens. See infra Section IV.A.2.
101. See, e.g., Rohr & Wright, supra note 85, at 22–23 (describing the different rights
that different blockchains provide to their holders, which may include certain
governance rights depending on the type of blockchain).
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but typically consist of direct decision making in the underlying assets
represented by the tokens.102 Some blockchains offer their unit
holders voting rights on a variety of questions. According to a recent
study, “nearly 25[ percent of tokens] provide some sort of governance
rights, like voting on decision polls.”103
In addition, because most blockchain-based assets are embedded in
open software, users can “fork” the code and lead the blockchain to a
different direction from that chosen by the lead developers, building
an alternative blockchain that mimics the rules of the original but has
certain modifications.104
Other voice mechanisms vary by asset. For example, in Bitcoin, the
voice option is technically embedded in a process called “Bitcoin
Improvement Proposals” (BIP),105 whereas in any open source project,
anyone can propose changes to the blockchain, coordinate a
discussion of their merits, and attempt to build a consensus in the
community in favor of implementing the proposal.106 BIPs are a
feature of decentralized ledger offerings that are generally not available
in centralized entities with centralized software and management.
II. EMBEDDED COSTS AND RISK FACTORS IN
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED ASSETS
This Section identifies unique costs and risk factors affected by the
blockchain technology. While every blockchain-based asset has an
idiosyncratic functional value and is pitched to potential investors with
an anticipation to deliver particularly innovative products or

102. See Bitcoin Improvement Proposals, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/
wiki/Bitcoin_Improvement_Proposals (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (explaining the
process through which decisions are made with respect to blockchain-based assets
because Bitcoin has “no formal structure” for voting on proposed changes).
103. CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT, supra note 9, at 2.
104. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 171.
105. Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/b/bitcoin-improvement-proposal-bip.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2018)
(“The Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) is a formal design document that outlines
the technical details and rationale for the features and changes to be introduced to
the bitcoin network.”).
106. Peter Van Valkenburgh, What Is “Open Source” and Why Is It Important for
Cryptocurrency and Open Blockchain Projects?, COIN CTR. (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://coincenter.org/entry/what-is-open-source-and-why-is-it-important-forcryptocurrency-and-open-blockchain-projects (“Open source software is collaboratively
produced, shared freely, published transparently, and developed to be a community
good rather than the property or business of a single company or person.”).
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technologies, blockchain-based assets share several embedded costs
and risk factors as an asset class, affected by their technology and
economic structure. The following analysis describes four of these
embedded costs and risk factors and draws attention to their unique
manifestation on the blockchain: controlling costs, monitoring costs,
systemic risks, and technology risks. Drawing attention to specific costs
and risk factors inherent to blockchain-based assets enables a more
concrete assessment of their potential regulation as securities.
A. Controlling Costs
Controlling costs are the costs the investor incurs from the behavior
of a party that is positioned with sufficient influence to exert control
on the blockchain, i.e., the entrepreneur, issuer, intermediary offering
the tokens, or any person in a position to significantly maneuver the
blockchain business and its operation.107
Controlling costs are an important source of blockchain agency
costs, and include potential self-dealing, which diverts value from the
blockchain. This is typically manifested in transactions between the
controller and the blockchain, transactions where value is transferred
from a particular blockchain holder to other businesses held by the
controller,108 other tunneling efforts, and lastly, fraud and misuse of
funds by the controller. Assessment of the prevalent controlling costs
of any particular blockchain-based asset in question is of critical
importance for the purpose of assessing the potential value of
regulating it as a security. In the absence of controlling costs, in its
pure decentralized form, the pivotal justification for securities
regulation dissolves: there are no informational asymmetries when no
party is positioned to influence and benefit from the blockchain more
than another, and there could be no expectation or reliance on the
managerial efforts of such controller and her performance.
In theory, decentralized blockchain technology can create and
cultivate assets for public investors without the traditional externalities
of agency costs. Blockchain technology allows for exchange and
transfer of property rights without relying on an intermediary,
replacing the traditional controller or issuer with a computing process

107. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Agency Costs of Controlling
Shareholders 6 (2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.jstor.org/stable/412
6740?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
108. For an analysis of indirect tunneling, see id. at 14–15.
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forming a consensus protocol within a network of nodes or users.109
The decentralized ledger technology implies that not all blockchains
have a controller.110 For example, Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency that
relies on a broad community of miners to expand and prosper,
replacing the traditional issuer with a network of dispersed users.111
Yet, reality is more complicated, and offerings of blockchain-based
assets have varied degrees of controlling costs. Assessing controlling
costs in a decentralized ledger requires a structural assessment of the
technical properties of the blockchain to see whether any particular
agent or party is positioned to influence the ledger and its
performance so as to (1) maneuver its business and operating
functionality, and (2) potentially divert value from holders of
blockchain-based assets (tokens or cryptocurrencies) towards the
agent or party or any affiliate. Blockchain investors should ask,
hypothetically, whether any particular party could potentially exert
control on the blockchain, and whether such control could carry costs
(e.g., by self-dealing or indirect tunneling) and thereby potentially
abuse the trust of token holders.
Assessing the ability to maneuver a blockchain-based asset is harder
than assessing the ability to maneuver a traditional corporation.
Unlike traditional corporations, where control is legally defined and
represented in shared ownership, control over a blockchain-based
asset is highly technical and elusive. Controllers of blockchain-based
assets do not necessarily share a limited pool of resources with other
owners of the blockchain’s units because often the supply of
blockchain-based units is infinite—or effectively infinite.112 Assessing
the degree of control over a blockchain-based asset requires technical
evaluation of a controller’s effective influence over the operating
functionality of the blockchain-based asset. Some blockchain-based
assets are operating on a centralized technology. For example, the
recent ICO of Iota, a decentralized ledger offering a cryptocurrency of

109. See Rohr & Wright, supra note 85, at 87 (explaining that “[b]lockchains are, at
their core, a technology that renders . . . intermediaries . . . largely unnecessary” due
to the function of smart contracts).
110. William Hinman, Director, Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto (June 14, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418.
111. For a detailed discussion of potential controlling costs in Bitcoin, see infra Section IV.
112. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing limited money supply in
blockchain-based assets); see also Cohney et al., supra note 96, at 33 (documenting a
lack of supply controls in initial coin offerings based on a 2017 survey).
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the internet of things, pitched itself as a decentralized ledger, yet
technically directed through a coordination node run through the Iota
foundation.113 Similarly, cryptocurrency Ripple is widely considered a
service running on centralized servers.114
Yet, in blockchain-based assets using a decentralized ledger as their
platform, the ability to maneuver the blockchain is harder to infer.
After all, each node—or holder—of the blockchain-based asset can
voluntarily decide whether or not to follow the controllers’
recommendation, and the software itself is typically open source and
can be easily duplicated.115 Some instances where control can be
manifested are protocol enhancement and security incident responses
(e.g., responses to cybersecurity violations in the protocol or software,
theft of tokens, etc.). Many blockchain-based assets have a group of
developers that enjoy a status of reputable leadership in the blockchain
community so as to influence holders of units of the blockchain-based
asset to voluntarily accept its recommendations and perform software
upgrades and/or fork according to the leadership’s recommendation.116
Such influence can be full or partial, but is rarely exclusive or binding.117
Assessment of controlling costs requires identification of controlling
parties possessing the technical ability to maneuver the blockchain,
with potential diversion of value from holders of units of the
blockchain-based asset to the controller(s). The ledger can be
technically decentralized, with controlling costs subtly embedded in the
original allocation of tokens of the blockchain, or through its code. For
example, some blockchains are offered to the public with a time-lag
delay that is designed to allow the offeror time to conduct “pre-mining”
with lower costs, effectively preceding the decentralized process with a
centralized one, granting the controller privileges.118 Controlling costs
can also arise from colluding miners on a decentralized ledger.
113. See Eric Wall, IOTA is Centralized, MEDIUM (June 14, 2017),
https://medium.com/@ercwl/iota-is-centralized-6289246e7b4d.
114. See Jamie Redman, ‘So Wait—Is Ripple Centralized After All?,’ BITCOINIST (Dec.
15, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://bitcoinist.com/wait-ripple-centralized.
115. See supra Section II.C.2 (providing an overview of language and form).
116. See About the Ethereum Foundation, ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/
foundation (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (stating that Ethereum’s mission includes
empowering developers and, more generally, working with developers to enhance the
blockchain community).
117. This is because each node can choose whether to install the recommended update
and/or whether to follow the fork or not. The leadership of a decentralized ledger is not
in position to enforce its recommendation other than by voluntary compliance.
118. See Madeira, supra note 59.
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Bitcoin miners could obtain revenue larger than their fair share by
colluding, implying that rational miners will prefer to join the selfish
miners, and the colluding group could potentially increase in size until
it becomes a controlling majority.119
To illustrate the prevalence of controlling costs diverting value from
investors to controllers on a decentralized ledger, consider the examples
of Confido, Iota, and DAO, all ICOs from 2017. Confido, a startup on
the Ethereum platform, vanished from the internet after raising
$374,000 from investors in an ICO fundraiser, having pitched itself as a
blockchain-based application for making payments and tracking
shipments.120 A few days after the offering, Confido deleted its Twitter
account and took down its website, leaving the raised amount in the
hands of its controllers.121 Another example is the DAO, a case
investigated by the SEC and thoroughly reviewed in this Article.122 In
this case, self-dealing was evident as DAO’s originator, Slock.it,
announced it would be the first to submit a proposal for funding by the
blockchain’s platform, effectively awarding itself a financial grant for
another business it owns at the expense of DAO’s token holders.123
B. Monitoring Costs
Different blockchains have different lengths of chain separating the
original cash producing asset from the ultimate investor with
economic rights to cash flows stemming from that asset.124 A structural
assessment of the blockchain is required to measure the placement of
the cash producing asset, both in terms of the length of the contractual
chain separating it from the ultimate investors and in terms of the
ability of automation platforms embedded in the blockchain to verify
performance, thereby reducing uncertainty and potential

119. Ittay Eyal & Emin Gün Sirer, Majority is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable, CORNELL
U. DEP’T COMPUT. SCI., https://www.cs.cornell.edu/~ie53/publications/ btcProcFC.pdf.
120. Jordan Pearson, An Ethereum Startup Just Vanished After People Invested $347K,
VICE (Nov. 20, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/j5
j34x/ethereum-startup-confido-vanished-after-people-invested.
121. Id.
122. See infra Section IV.A.2.
123. For the SEC report on the DAO, see infra note 225.
124. See Bitcoin vs Ethereum, supra note 66 (comparing Bitcoin and Ethereum to
illustrate how different blockchains have different lengths of chain, which ultimately
results in different transaction speeds).
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manipulation.125 Monitoring costs have a pernicious effect on the
ability of investors to evaluate their investment’s merit ex ante and to
assess its performance ex post. Therefore, a thorough understanding
of costs should be a key factor is assessing the adequacy of the potential
securities regulation of the blockchain.
In some blockchains, the underlying sources of value can be verified
automatically on the blockchain, while other blockchains require offchain verification.126 In the latter cases, an exogenous performance of
an underlying value source, such as real economic assets, products,
services, indices, commodities, or technologies, are attached to the
token and are virtually represented by the blockchain’s units.127 As
derivative contracts, tokens can represent value in an underlying
market sphere, and thus their holders are exposed to shifts and
movements in that underlying market. When the value of the token is
on-chain, the blockchain technology offers an automated verification
process for the exchange forming the transaction.128 Either the value
is intrinsic to the token itself, as is the case with Bitcoin, or the value is
extrinsic to the token but can still be verified automatically on
platforms attached to it.129 However, when the value attached to the
token is off-chain, the automatic verification protocols of the
blockchain are insufficient—monitoring cannot be automated.
Monitoring costs of the value underlying the blockchain will be
particularly high when the value represented by the blockchain is
vague, cannot be verified automatically, or when the underlying value
has to do with off-chain entities and expected future performances.

125. See O’Shields, supra note 91, at 179 (discussing the beneficial role of smart
contracts, which reduce uncertainty and potential manipulation by ensuring that
agreements are properly executed and enforced in the blockchain).
126. See Off-Chain Transactions, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/OffChain_Transactions (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (highlighting the key differences
between off-chain and on-chain transactions in the context of blockchain-based assets).
127. See supra Section I.C.1 (considering the different sources of value attached to
blockchain-based assets).
128. But
see
On
Chain
Transactions
(Cryptocurrency),
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/chain-transactions-cryptocurrency.asp (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018) (asserting that on-chain transactions “rarely occur instantly” even
though they are “supposed to occur in real time . . . to keep blockchain transactions . . .
verifiable . . . and instantaneous”).
129. John Kelleher, What is Bitcoin’s Intrinsic Value?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/091814/what-bitcoins-intrinsicvalue.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
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Monitoring the value of the blockchain’s off-chain requires an
expansion of the blockchain’s automated capacities, giving rise to
asymmetric information, opportunism, self-dealings, and other
potential agency costs.130 It is simply something the automated
verification process of blockchain cannot yet do. When the value
attached to the token is off-chain, monitoring the underlying value may
require an intermediary or another established protocol for its
continuous ongoing assessment.131 Because on-chain values can be
monitored through the automated blockchain protocol, and off-chain
values cannot, the cost of monitoring exogenous values represented by
tokens becomes costly and is prone to manipulation and misinformation.
To illustrate, consider the cases of Confido and DAO mentioned
above.132 In Confido, assessment of value had to do with monitoring
the value of making payments and tracking shipments in Germany, the
service Confido pitched itself with.133 In the DAO case, assessment of
value had to do with the changing value of the investments portfolio
formed by the funded projects chosen by the blockchain enterprise.134
Both missions cannot be verified automatically, and require an
intermediary, an auditor, or some other agency to perform ongoing
valuations for the performance of an off-chain enterprise.
Blockchains can employ a number of mechanisms to address the
costs of off-chain monitoring. First, they may allocate property rights
through the provision of actual assets to the token holders. For
example, Filecoin provides its token holders with storage space, and
uses replication parameters to protect against different threat
models.135 Second, blockchains may use a trusted third party to provide
a guarantee for the data forming the underlying value, replacing the

130. Understanding Off-Chain Transactions in Blockchain for Fun and Profit, MEDIUM
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://medium.com/@liquidity.network/understanding-off-chaintransactions-in-blockchain-for-fun-and-profit-591e7e27ccc0.
131. Thomas Jay Rush, Decentralized, Off-chain, Per-block Accounting, Monitoring, and
Reconciliation of Blockchains, https://quickblocks.io/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
2017-Rush-Decentralized-Off-Chain-per-Block-Accounting-Monitoring-andReconciliation-for-Blockchains.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
132. See supra Section IV.A.2.
133. See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 120–123 and accompanying text.
135. The protocol’s cloud storage network also provides security, as content is
encrypted end-to-end by the client, while the storage providers do not have access to
an encryption key.
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traditional valuation agent.136 Third, blockchains may use reputational
incentive in cases where the offeror has, or plans to have, a history or a
sequence of repeat transactions.137
C. Technology Risk
Blockchain technologies hedge against some risks and aggravate
others. Due to blockchain technology, blockchain-based assets with
decentralized ledgers are generally resilient to damages and
interruptions from natural disasters such as earthquakes, terrorist
attacks, computer viruses, and other catastrophes. As the decentralized
ledger runs simultaneously on each node and every node also
maintains it, damage to any particular node or small group of nodes
does not disrupt the functioning of the ledger.138
However, encoding the investment contract on the blockchain poses
risk for costly mistakes and hidden bugs impeding the blockchain’s
performance. Harm from a mistake or a bug in a blockchain-based
asset cannot be undone by revoking the investment contract, and
therefore exposes investors to cyber-attacks, interventions, and
manipulations by third parties.139 Unlike traditional contracts that are
subject to enforcement by courts, smart contracts are technically
immutable: automatically enforced according to their original code
with no allowance for ex post discretion.140 Automation inevitably
makes smart contracts complete, despite their inevitable realistic
incompleteness due to uncertainty, risks, and simple “bugs” and coding
mistakes.141 Thus, the costs of detecting the mistake and debugging the
136. See, e.g., TOWN CRIER, http://www.town-crier.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2018)
(showing an example of an authenticated data feed for smart contracts).
137. Vitalik Buterin, Visions, Part 1: The Value of Blockchain Technology, ETHEREUM (Apr.
12, 2015), https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/04/13/visions-part-1-the-value-of-blockchaintechnology (discussing the value of reputation to the blockchain as a platform).
138. The consensus protocols used to maintain the ledger rely on some assumptions
about the nodes, typically (in a blockchain based on proof-of-work consensus) that
among the nodes participating in mining, at least half of the computational power
belongs to nodes that behave honestly.
139. See infra notes 143–144.
140. See Mary Juetten, Legal Technology and Smart Contracts: Blockchain and Smart
Contracts (Part IV), FORBES (Sept. 6, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
maryjuetten/2017/09/06/legal-technology-and-smart-contracts-blockchain-smart-contractspart-iv (discussing how smart contracts are used to strictly enforce the contracts).
141. See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 36–37 (2005)
(explaining that contracts may be incomplete since they cannot explicitly address all
possible contingencies or future events); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles
of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981); Oliver Hart & John Moore,
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blockchain investment contract are very high. Investors are unlikely to
reveal the information, given their relative stake in the transaction and
collective action costs, and the seller has few incentives to do so, as
debugging the smart contract ex ante does not necessarily increase seller
profits. Because information regarding facts leading to a mistake is so
scarce, in particular given the unique coding language used by each
blockchain, it may make the most sense to assign the costs of a potential
mistake to the seller, who is the cheaper information-gatherer.142
One example of the risks in “bugs” is the June 2016 cyber-attack on
DAO, under which the attacker removed 3.6 million ETH, a third of the
total raised by the DAO offering, from DAO’s Ethereum blockchain to
another Ethereum blockchain controlled by the attacker, utilizing a bug
in the software of the DAO’s smart contract.143 The bug was an
inseparable part of the contract between the DAO blockchain and the
DAO token holders.144 The bug was essentially a mutual mistake, an
incorrect belief shared by both parties at the time of the offering about
the contractual terms. While legal conventional wisdom about mutual
mistakes as incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts145
makes the contract potentially void,146 automation of the contract on a
blockchain makes avoidance technically impossible. Smart contracts are
a “one-way train,” technically unstoppable.147

Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 115, 116 (1999) (discussing
the challenges of incomplete contracting); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis,
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 822–24 (2006). Unlike
traditional incomplete contracting, which is an outcome of the high costs of
predicting, understanding, and assessing the probabilities and the costs in different
potential states of the world, a bug in the software running the blockchain is a
complete form specifying the possibility of failure ex ante—contractually embedded
in complex coding language.
142. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1978).
143. For the SEC’s investigation report assigning the DAO as a security, see infra
Section IV.A and note 225.
144. See infra Section IV.A.2; Report on Investigation, infra note 225, at 9.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (“Where a mistake of both
parties at the time of contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract
was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract
is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mistake stated
in section 154.”).
146. E. ALLAN FARNWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 509, 520–21 (1990).
147. See Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 263, 302 (2017) (suggesting that the rigid nature of smart contract interpretation
is not always a good thing).
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Eventually, in this case, and subject to their ad hoc ultimate
discretion, developers of Ethereum led by Vitalik Buterin decided to
voluntarily apply (with no legal or technical obligation) a “fork” into
the Ethereum blockchain so as to create a new version of code with
new rules for Ethereum that would rule out the attack and recreate a
new version of the blockchain, where an alternative “better” universe
exists and where the attack could not have occurred.148 The fork
undermines the decentralized vision of Ethereum and is essentially a
form of a bailout given by the leadership of Ethereum ad hoc. There
is no published governance procedure for making such future
decisions, and clearly, they are not necessarily replicable.
The DAO fork had a double effect. First, in the new amended
universe established by the fork, called “Ethereum Classic,”149 holders
of DAO tokens fully recovered their stolen funds, so despite the cyberattack, holders of DAO could exchange their DAO tokens to Ether
cryptocurrency issued by the Ethereum blockchain.150 Second, the
original Ethereum blockchain continues to run alongside Ethereum
Classic, and in it, the attackers still have access to the stolen funds. As
a result of the fork, both the attacker and the holders of DAO tokens
can exchange tokens to ETH and then to USD.
The case of the DAO/Ethereum fork demonstrates the complexity of
applications of blockchain technology to the financial services sector.
Automation makes property rights crystal clear, but exposes them to bugs
and other mistakes on a rigid platform with zero ex post flexibility.151 A
bug in the code discovered along the course of business can only be
remedied by a platform-wide amendment, exposing investors to the
ultimate discretion of the platform leadership, if one exists, while also

148. Francis Coppola, A Painful Lesson for the Ethereum Community, FORBES (July 21,
2016, 1:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2016/07/21/apainful-lesson-for-the-ethereum-community (“The fact is that Ethereum has
compromised its principles in order to rescue a client. Or, in the language of another
world, the Ethereum central bank has directly recapitalized the DAO commercial bank
by monetizing its debts.”).
149. See generally Antonio Madeira, What is Ethereum Classic, CRYPTOCOMPARE (Oct.
4, 2018), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/what-is-ethereum-classic;
Ethereum Classic, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/ethereumclassic.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
150. Antonio Madeira, The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and the Hard Fork,
CRYPTOCOMPARE (July 30, 2018), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/thedao-the-hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork.
151. Managing the Risks of Blockchain, BANKING TECH (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.bankingtech.com/2018/03/managing-the-risks-of-blockchain.
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giving rise to systemic financial stability concerns due to a new form of
quantum financial institution, where financial assets can be duplicated,
recreated and co-exist simultaneously within two ends of the fork.152
D. Systemic Risk
Blockchain-based assets impede transparency and contractual
flexibility in ways that potentially increase widespread financial distress
in the markets, defined in the literature as a systemic risk.153
Financial crises are often preceded by a bubble in which one or more
classes of assets are traded at prices far in excess of their fundamental
values.154 The accuracy of price signals depends in part on the
presence of informed traders in the relevant marketplace.155 The lack
of sufficiently informed traders can increase the amount of noise
surrounding the price signals created in that market.156 When overexcitement and over-optimism are added, the noise tends to skew price
signals and creates an environment in which it is easier for a bubble to
develop.157 Blockchain offerings are inherently structured to reflect
such an environment. The nature of the blockchain offering requires
a translation from code to English to assess the terms of the investment,
making the contract effectively indecipherable for many (if not most)
investors. While no empirical profiling of blockchain investors has
been published, the lack of institutional representation in the
blockchain territory suggests that at least some of that value acceleration
stems from investors who have limited ability to assess the quality of the

152. See Coppola, supra note 148.
153. Hal S. Scott, Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation, 13 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 763, 763–64 (2010).
154. Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, BROOKINGS (Nov. 24,
2008), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-origins-of-the-financial-crisis.
155. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 570 n.67 (1984).
156. Id. at 578.
157. Minsky’s instability hypothesis posits that the inherent instability of the
financial system is driven by the frequency and amplitude of investments made, based
on lender assessment rather than aggregate value.
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assets underlying their investments.158 Bitcoin, for example, has risen
within eight years to a total market capitalization of $138 billion.159
Another cause of concern that is often overlooked is manifested by
“forks” in the blockchain platform, essentially printing an alternative
mirrored universe of money, with dubious value.160 The technical
triviality of duplicating entire crypto currencies with their user network
in a world where almost all software is open sourced raises a concern.
Consider the examples of duplicating Bitcoin’s network with a fork,
discussed above.161 After years of debate among Bitcoin holders about
the limited scale of the Bitcoin, a group of Bitcoin holders copied
Bitcoin’s code and applied it on an alternative blockchain, and
simultaneously copied all of the Bitcoin owners’ data and granted
them respective rights in the new alternative blockchain (free of
charge), effectively copying Bitcoin’s entire network and applying it on
an alternative blockchain.162 This move resulted in the creation of
Bitcoin Cash,163 a rival cryptocurrency that is similar to Bitcoin but
touts a far larger block size. As a result of the fork, Bitcoin holders
passively became simultaneous holders of both Bitcoin and Bitcoin
Cash, two clone cryptocurrencies, each with its own rates of return,

158. The fast acceleration in value has led many to consider ICOs and other
blockchain offerings “unmasked as scams and Ponzi schemes” touched with
“observable overexcitement.” Dirk Zetzsche et al., The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s
a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators 12 (Paper No. 2017-011, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3072298. See generally HYMAN P. MINSKY, CAN “IT” HAPPEN
AGAIN?: ESSAYS ON INSTABILITY AND FINANCE 9 (1982). My question refers to
infrastructure securitization and the Great Recession following the 2007-2009 financial
crisis and does not analyze characteristics of other financial crises. See Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the
Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 167 (2011).
159. As of November 24, 2017. Calculated as the number of tokens in circulation
times the value of each token. The second largest cryptocurrency, Ethereum, has a
$30 billion market cap. See Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization, COIN
MARKET CAP, https://coinmarketcap.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
160. Sometimes, blockchain forks represent actual sources of value, amending the
original code source in a significant way. Other times, the forks are simply a bailout
mechanism internal to the platform that allows an effective method to increase the
quantity of money analogous to printing money by central banks.
161. See supra notes 46–48.
162. See David Glance, Bitcoin Splits and Bitcoin Cash is Created: Explaining Why and
What Happens Now, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 1, 2017, 10:05 PM), http://theconver
sation.com/bitcoin-splits-and-bitcoin-cash-is-created-explaining-why-and-what-happensnow-81943.
163. Id.
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fluctuations, and technical specifications. The new currency is added as
an additional asset on top of holders’ stake in the original blockchain.
Blockchain offerings pose a systemic risk for a third reason: their
rigidity and “stickiness.” Stickiness refers to contractual “arrangements
[that] are exceptionally difficult to modify.”164 Contractual rigidity and
stickiness increase the likelihood that any particular loan would be
foreclosed because renegotiation is less likely and incurs significant
costs.165 When contractual rigidity and stickiness are widespread
phenomena across a market, their accumulated effect may lead to
systemic risk.166 Contractual rigidity and stickiness were shown to
increase systemic risks in the 2007–2009 financial crisis.167 In
blockchain territory, stickiness and contractual rigidity are inevitable.
In a recent application of Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert
Scott’s work on braiding to blockchain territory,168 Jeremy Sklaroff has
argued that blockchain-based assets impede both the semantic
flexibility and the enforcement flexibility of traditional contracts.169
Semantic flexibility comes from the inherent ambiguity of human
language. In traditional contracts, performance standards, such as
“good faith” or “commercially reasonable,” are critical tools for parties
contracting in uncertain or volatile environments. Ambiguous
contractual language postpones interpretation of a term until there’s
more information about the parties’ performance, lowering the costs
of negotiation and drafting. It also shifts those costs to the
enforcement stage of the contracting process, where a court applies
interpretation rules to give substance to the term.170 Yet, blockchainbased assets are embedded in code, a binary language leaving no room
for ex post interpretation. Likewise, as illustrated above, automation

164. Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity,
and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 700–03 (2012).
165. Id. at 704–05.
166. Id. at 709.
167. Loans packaged into securitized polls were less likely to be renegotiated and
amended, compelling enforcement despite high externalities due to high
coordination costs. As some researchers vividly pointed out, “when such rigid
contracts are ubiquitous, they can function as social suicide pacts.” Anna Gelpern &
Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2009).
168. See generally Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract
Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 26 (2014); Robert E. Scott et al., Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010).
169. Sklaroff, supra note 147.
170. Gilson et al., supra note 168, at 42.
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on a blockchain makes avoidance and amendment technically
impossible, impeding the enforcement flexibility of blockchain
investment contracts as well.171 Blockchain-based assets are inevitably
rigid and “sticky” and may therefore increase systemic risk because no
party has the discretion to amend them, even if so desired. Yet,
securities regulation is not a suitable instrument to address stickiness
as an independent source of systemic risk. Mandatory disclosure
cannot create contractual flexibility on the blockchain.
Finally, assessment of systemic risks has to do with the degree of
interconnectivity of the subject of concern. Bank failure is considered
a mega-economic event because when banks go down, many other
parts of the real economy go with them, whether due to a heavy
contractual chain of commitments, derivatives trading, and/or a
simple downturn of the short-term debt supply.172 With most
blockchain-based assets, as of 2018, such interconnectivity is still
minimal, trading volumes are rather low, and there is not much
contractual activity between the blockchain space and the real
economy. If a blockchain goes down in 2018, it is hard to see how the
entire economy would be affected, and how other segments of the
economy would be curtailed. Yet, the degree of interconnectivity of a
blockchain-based asset is a potential source of systemic risk, and as
argued below, should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by regulators
considering the blockchain’s potential regulation as a security.173
III. JUSTIFICATION FOR SECURITIES REGULATION OF
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED ASSETS
This section builds upon the descriptive foundations of the
preceding parts and merges the unique properties of blockchain-based
assets, embedded costs and risk factors, and theorizes about when
securities regulation is warranted. Major theoretical justifications for
securities regulations are reviewed, shedding light on when securities
regulations of blockchain-based assets are theoretically warranted.
According to the Securities Act, an offer or sale of securities to the
public must be accompanied by a full and fair disclosure, enabling

171. See Sklaroff, supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting the inherent
challenges in amending contracts automated on blockchain).
172. Cf. JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 3–4 (2016).
173. See infra notes 201–205 and accompanying text.
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potential purchasers to make an informed investment decision.174 This
vision of transparency is afforded by mandatory registration with the
SEC and requires, inter alia, delivery of a statutory prospectus
informing purchasers about the issuer’s financial statements,
management, business, and price and the amount of securities to be
offered.175 Securities include “investment contracts,” defined as
investments of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others.176 For any investment that is not in a form
of cash, the question arises whether an investment contract exists.
A. Mandatory Disclosure
The impetus of the mandatory disclosure is to remove the
information asymmetry between investors and offerors so as to
promote informed investment decisions.
According to the
conventional wisdom, mandatory disclosure afforded by securities laws
holds the promise to enhance price accuracy and thereby
accommodate value maximization of firms for their owners.177 In the
absence of disclosure costs and if purchasers know that firms have a
given piece of information and deem it relevant to their decision, a
firm is theoretically expected to reveal all its information.178 Even in
the presence of disclosure costs, sellers offering blockchain-based
assets or “tokens” have good incentives to voluntarily disclose its
properties as a means of differentiating their own tokens from others
174. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)–(c) (2012) (prohibiting the sale or offer to buy securities
unless a registration statement has been filed; also prohibiting unregistered offerings);
SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that
violations of § 5 do not require scienter).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 77(f)–(g), (j) (2012); SEC v. Cavanagh, 1 F. Supp. 2d 337, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
176. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
177. Allen Ferrell, Measuring the Effects of Mandated Disclosure, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
371, 372 (2004).
178. This result is rooted in the assumption of perfect functioning of information
markets. If prices fully reflect quality, sellers have the incentive to disclose information
about product quality so that they can charge an adequate price for their product. In
the absence of such disclosure, consumers will not pay the designated price since they
would assume the worst about the product’s value. Thus, sellers, except those offering
the lowest quality, have an incentive to voluntarily disclose information regarding their
product. If disclosure is costly, sellers are expected to voluntarily disclose only if their
quality exceeds a threshold. Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and
Private Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 461 (1981); W. Kip Viscusi, A
Note on “Lemons” Markets with Quality Certification, 9 BELL J. OF ECON. 277, 279 (1978).
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available on the market. If the offering does not disclose token
information, the offeror will not be able to charge extra for the
additional quality provided. This is because in the absence of
information about product differentiation, purchasers are expected to
assume a similar level of quality for competing products. Therefore,
sellers of above-average products have an incentive to disclose further
information, distinguishing their products from the lower-quality
competitors.179 Theoretically, this scenario may result in a reversed
“lemon” process180—if purchasers assume non-disclosing sellers are
offering lower quality products, more and more sellers would disclose to
associate themselves with higher quality products. With more sellers
disclosing, the process would repeat itself until all types, except the lowest,
are disclosed. Such a process is expected to lower the average percentage
of non-disclosing sellers, until every seller discloses.181 If informed
consumers reach a critical mass, sellers in a sufficiently competitive
market will have an incentive to cater to the needs of these informed
buyers and thus confer benefits to the non-informed consumers as well.182
Disclosure is not likely to stem voluntarily when investors are of
diverse backgrounds and lack the technical expertise required to assess
the terms of the offering. When purchasers fail to understand sellers’
disclosures, disclosure is less likely to stem voluntarily. Under such
conditions, sellers of higher quality products will not be able to
distinguish themselves from sellers of lower quality products, and lowquality sellers will have incentives to hide their quality.183 Conversely,
179. See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L.
& ECON. 491, 502 (1981).
180. See generally Viscusi, supra note 175.
181. See Grossman, supra note 178, at 465. This analysis considered in itself implies
that regulatory intervention in disclosure is completely unnecessary as eventually all
sellers would disclose in order to signal quality. It is also backed up by some empirical
works: George Benston, for example, compared the pre- and post-legislation
disclosure made by firms prior to the 1934 Securities Regulation reform, finding that
no significant price effect resulted from the new mandated disclosure and concluding
that voluntary disclosure prior to the act was sufficiently efficient. See George J.
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 144–45 (1973).
182. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
183. This scenario is typically called market for lemons, since the marketplace rule
applied here creates a race to the bottom on product quality: no seller has incentives
to invest in higher quality products when higher quality cannot translate to higher
prices. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 488, 488 (1970).
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when all investors are sophisticated, the reasoning for mandatory
disclosure weakens, and offerors have better incentives to voluntarily
disclose information to signal their competitiveness.
Thus, the identity of investors and their ability to fend for themselves
is key to the assessment of a contract’s status as a security. Investors of
blockchain-based assets should be literate in code and have sufficient
degree of technical proficiency to assess the terms of their investment
and translate product knowledge into quality and price. Code, almost
by definition, is complex and technical, but it is not indecipherable.
In blockchain settings, it is typically open source and available for
inspection. Investors who have the technical and/or financial
resources to read the blockchain’s code can fend for themselves and
do without the protection of securities regulation.
Securities
regulation can bring value in reducing the cost of information
asymmetry for main street investors. Yet, as of 2018, investment in
blockchain-based assets requires a rather high degree of technical
and/or financial sophistication. Traditional financial intermediaries
generally do not offer crypto investments off the shelf, and some
consider it a threat.184 Investors who are not tech savvy, or lack access
to those who are, face a significant entry barrier to blockchain territory.
B. Standardization
Securities regulation is not only a means of mandatory disclosure, it
is also a means to impose a mandatory uniform platform for
information management. In many cases, voluntary disclosure means
little without a backdrop for comparison of the underlying product
whose features are disclosed. Take the securities market as an
example. A company’s statement as to its expected return on
investment is meaningless without a standardized measure of industry
or market performance that a potential investor can benchmark
against. For this reason, securities regulation provides mandatory
uniform conventions for financial statements, and sees this mandatory
uniform convention as central to its purpose.185 Raw data provided out
of context is not very helpful.
184. David Floyd, Bank of America, JPMorgan Call Cryptocurrencies a Threat,
INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 28, 2018, 11:12 AM), https://www.investopedia.com/news/bankamerica-calls-cryptocurrencies-risk-its-business.
185. Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory
Disclosure? 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 702 (2004) (quoting CLYDE P. STICKNEY & ROMAN L. WEIL,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 249 (10th ed., 2003)) (“This comparative advantage of
disclosure, however, was never emphasized by the legal scholarship that dealt with the
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Without mandatorily imposed standards of disclosure, as securities
regulations provide, every seller would disclose in his own terms,
language, and format, leading to market dynamics in which sellers would
have no credible disclosure capacity or technology, and insufficient public
quality assurances. Under such dynamics, as Akerlof’s model of market
for lemons suggests, only the average quality of the goods will be
considered and fairly priced by consumers, and above-average quality
products will be eventually driven out of the market.186
To enhance standardization, securities laws created a mandatory
disclosure regime.187 Disclosed information under securities laws has
to fit the same patterns and be provided by the same metrics by all
disclosing parties. The SEC collects all the submitted disclosures and
posts them on its centralized website, EDGAR.188 The standardization
function of securities regulation requires exclusivity, so that free
speech and other promotional media of expression are not permitted.
C. Investor Vulnerability
Securities laws were introduced in the 1930s to restore retail
investors’ trust in capital markets.189 Reliable standardized mandatory
disclosures are generally considered to enhance this trust, and thereby
improve market participation.190 Without regulatory intervention, markets

mandatory disclosure system. The absence of an inquiry into the nature of these
benefits is odd, since at first glance the comparative benefits of disclosure, if they are
indeed essential for the welfare of the capital markets, seem like a good justification
for mandated disclosure.”).
186. See Akerlof, supra note 183.
187. One such mandatory disclosure manifests in Regulation FD (“Fair
Disclosure”). 17 C.F.R. § 243.100–.103 (2011). See generally Allen Farrell, The Case for
Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World (Harv. John M. Olin Ctr.
for L., Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 492), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ferrell_492.pdf.
188. EDGAR, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
189. As Professor Donald Langevoort explains:
[T]hroughout the SEC’s history and culture, the rhetorical stress has been on
the plight of average investors, ones who lack investing experience and
sophistication so as to need the protection of the securities laws . . . The
subsequent history of rules, interpretations, and enforcement by the SEC is
filled with references to both the need to promote retail-level investor
confidence . . . and the desire to level the playing field between the meek and
the privileged.
Langevoort, supra note 15, at 1025–26.
190. Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. OF ACCT. RES. 391, 391 (2009).
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are unlikely to yield efficient levels of trust, both because rationally,
incentives to collect information by each investor are suboptimal,191 and
behaviorally, investors are subject to psychological distortions and biases
that will leave their knowledge below the desired level.192
One example for how securities laws cater to the needs of vulnerable
investors is the “plain English requirement.”193 According to Securities
Act Rule 421(d), issuers of securities are required to provide on the
inside front and outside back cover of a prospectus, a summary of the
offering and a discussion of the most significant risk factors that make
the offering speculative or risky, detailed in plain English.194
Rule 421(b) provides further guidance on how to prepare a prospectus
to meet the preexisting rule that a prospectus be “clear, concise and
understandable.”195 Together, these rules provide that disclosure under
securities laws be accessible and comprehensible to vulnerable investors.
To simplify complex information, disclosures are to be given in short
sentences, in definite concrete and everyday language, in tabular
presentation or bullet lists whenever possible, and with no legal jargon.196
With blockchain-based assets, the terms of investment are typically
embedded in code, and while theoretically, purchasers can view the code,
they are rarely in a position to assess its contents due to the highly
complex and technical language. Literacy in coding language requires
technical training, and even for those who possess skill, coding languages
vary from one blockchain to another and require technical versatility from
their readers. The identity of investors and their ability to fend for
themselves is a critical test for the applicability of securities regulation.
D. Corporate Governance
The fourth generic justification for mandatory disclosure is based on
its effect on the firm’s governance. As Louis Brandeis famously stated
in 1913, “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”197 Brandeis
191. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
69 (2008) (proposing that safety regulations are needed to help restore the market).
192. See John Y. Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1554 (2006)
(describing the collective action problem in the mortgage market that prevents sellers
from educating consumers).
193. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2011).
194. Id.
195. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR
SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 65 (1998).
196. See id. (describing the presentation guidelines for Rule 421(b)).
197. Brandeis’s famous idiom appeared first in Harper’s Weekly in a piece
recommending a legal requirement for public companies to disclose their profits and
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argued that transparency would create incentives for better ex ante
performance and would transform corporate reality by virtue of making
it transparent.198 As shown by Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk, asymmetric
information at the time of the offering indeed distorts corporate governance
structures adopted voluntarily, leading to the adoption of corporate
arrangements that are commonly known to be inefficient.199
When there is a person or organization performing an essential function
critical to the success of the enterprise, mandatory disclosure is required to
allow investors to assess the knowledge, performance, and financial stakes
of that person or organization, both in the normal course of business and
as a means of aligning the controllers’ incentives with those of investors,
mitigating agency costs and potential private benefits.200
Mandatory disclosure can also serve as a regulatory mechanism for
verification and monitoring which may fill the monitoring function for
purchasers when the automated platform of the blockchain is illequipped to execute the monitoring task, in particular when the value
underlying the blockchain-based asset is off-chain.
E. Systemic Risks
In the division of labor between regulatory agencies, monitoring
systemic risks is typically considered the responsibility of the financial
sector regulators. Securities regulation, in comparison, is traditionally
concerned with investor protection and efficient market functioning.201
Yet, informational asymmetries in the blockchain territory may warrant
securities regulation. Mandatory disclosure can serve as a mechanism for
reliably keeping prices tied to underlying values, a pertinent cause of
concern with current blockchain offerings often described as an asset
bubble.202 As we learned from previous financial crises, the risk of
losses as a means to end deception by insider trading. While advocating for Securities
Regulation, Brandeis pointed to the earlier 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, which
required listing of ingredients on interstate shipments of foods as a model of sunlight
as a means to mitigate public risks. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
198. See id. at 103 (noting that the law should require full disclosures to consumers).
199. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Asymmetric Information and the Choice of Corporate Governance
Arrangements 1, 26 (Harv. John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus., Paper No. 398, 2002).
200. See Zingales, supra note 190, at 394–95 (describing the benefits and costs of
mandatory disclosure).
201. Anita I. Anand, Is Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?, 60 U. TORONTO
L.J. 941, 943 (2010).
202. The Market in Initial Coin Offerings Risks Becoming a Bubble, THE ECONOMIST (Apr.
27, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/04/27/the-
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misinformed investments can easily develop into a widespread panic and
a paralyzing uncertainty.203 When a signal conveys new information
suggesting that an investor has dramatically underappreciated the nature
or magnitude of a risk to which the investor is exposed, that revelation
introduces the possibility that the investor may also be exposed to other
underappreciated risks, making previously assumed information
insensitivity suddenly sensitive, and causing a change in the investor’s
attitude across the portfolio.204 Overall, there are reasons for concern,
and the SEC has the necessary legal authority to act as a financial stability
regulator, according to § 2 of the Securities Exchange Act, as well as in
discharging its investor protection mandate.205
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Section addresses the policy implications of the preceding
analysis to the question of securities regulation of blockchain-based
assets. Aiming to clarify the distinction between securities and nonsecurities offerings on the blockchain, it reviews and criticizes the
major legal test applied for when an investment contract is considered
a security as articulated by the Supreme Court in Howey206 and recently
applied to the blockchain territory by the SEC in the DAO report.207 It
then proposes an initial distinction between two principal groups of
investors: sophisticated investors and retail investors. For sophisticated
investors, this Article examines the case for a quasi-144(a) private
market on the blockchain, allowing trading without registration
among sophisticated investors. For retail investors, or in cases of
diverse investor profiles, this Article contends that the regulators
should assess the embedded costs and risk factors underlying the
particular blockchain offering, balanced against the costs of securities
regulation. The analysis is then illustrated on three case studies of

market-in-initial-coin-offerings-risks-becoming-a-bubble (comparing the blockchain
“craze” to the South Sea bubble in the nineteenth century).
203. See Judge, supra note 164, at 663 (describing the lessons learned from the 2007–
2009 financial crisis).
204. See, e.g., id. at 699–700 (discussing the investors in the 2007–2009 financial crisis).
205. Hillary J. Allen, Financial Stability Regulation as Indirect Investor/Consumer
Protection Regulation: Implications for Regulatory Mandates and Structure, 90 TUL. L. REV.
1113, 1126–27 (2016).
206. See 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (rejecting the Court of Appeals’ test that analyzed
whether an investment contract was missing).
207. See infra notes 225–238 and accompanying text (describing the DAO case and
its implications to blockchain technology).
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blockchain-based offerings: Bitcoin, Tezos, and Filecoin. Finally, this
Section surveys alternative regulatory baskets that may apply to the
blockchain territory, whether as supplemental legal instruments or as
alternative regulatory arrangements. Examples of alternative regulatory
baskets are: private placements, crowdfunding laws, contracts and
consumer protection, financial and money services laws, and state laws.
A. Are Blockchain-based Assets Securities under U.S. Law?
The Howey test
The question of whether securities regulation applies has to do with
whether the offer is designated as an offer of a security.208 Under
§ 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, a
security includes “an investment contract.”209 An investment contract
is an investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others.210 If the offer is categorized as a security
(including an investment contract), securities laws and regulations
apply, mandatory disclosure is required, public information is
provided through EDGAR, and multiple corporate governance
implications apply, significantly limiting the contractual freedom of
the firm’s leadership.211 If, however, the offer is considered a product
or a service, rather than an investment, freedom of commercial speech
applies to information disclosed by the corporation to the public, and
freedom of contracts applies to the organizational incentives of the
offeror. The implications of designating a blockchain and/or its
tokens as securities are therefore profound.
The test of whether an offering constitutes a security was established by
the Supreme Court in Howey.212 In this case, the respondent offered “units
of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract for cultivating,
marketing and remitting net proceeds to the investor.”213 Each purchaser
was offered both a land sales contract and a service contract, after being
told that it “was not feasible to invest in the grove” unless a service contract
1.

208. See, e.g., Howey, 328 U.S. at 294, 298 (analyzing whether an offering of citrus
grove units were securities within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933).
209. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)–(c) (2012) (defining a security).
210. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (analyzing
the meaning of an investment contract).
211. COX ET AL., supra note 8, at 29–30.
212. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
213. Id. at 294.
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was made.214 The land sale contract provided a “uniform purchase price
per acre or fraction thereof, varying in amount only with the number of
years the plot had been planted with citrus trees.”215 The service contract
gave the possession over the land to a party affiliated to the seller, where
the company was accountable only for an allocation of the net profits
based on a check made at the time of picking. Purchasers in the Howey
case were, for the most part, non-residents of Florida, predominantly
business people who lacked the knowledge and equipment to cultivate
citrus groves.216 The SEC claimed that the transaction constituted an
“investment contract” subject to the Securities Act to obligate the seller to
uphold the disclosure requirements.217
The Supreme Court test for a security is based on both the
purchasers’ motivation, and on the dependency of the contractual
enterprise’s success on the efforts of the respondents.218 In the opinion
of the Supreme Court, the purchasers were “attracted solely” by the
prospect of a return on their investment, and the cultivation of citrus
groves was “seldom . . . economically feasible.”219 It is therefore the
dependency on the efforts of the respondents that made the
contractual agreement “[a] common enterprise managed by [the]
respondents.”220 Even though the rights to the land were legally
transferred, the Supreme Court considered the transfer “purely
incidental” to the core elements of the transaction.221 Regardless of
the legal terminology, respondents managed, controlled and operated
the enterprise, and since the elements of a profit-seeking business
venture were present, securities laws were therefore applicable.
Purchaser motivation has served as a test for the securities nature of
the offering in cases since then as well. In United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman,222 a housing cooperative in New York City offered
apartments through shares of stock that were explicitly tied to the
apartment, and the respondent claimed that the Information Bulletin
214. Id. at 295.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 296–97.
217. Id. at 297.
218. See id. at 301. See generally id. at 298–99 (“[A]n investment contract for purposes
of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party . . . .”).
219. Id. at 300.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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that accompanied the transaction failed to disclose several critical
facts. The test applied by the Court of Appeals was the expectations of
profits.223 The court denied the claim for mandatory disclosure of
material facts because the purchasers were attracted solely by the
prospect of acquiring a place to live and not by the financial returns of
their investment, and hence could not benefit from the protection
granted by securities laws.224
2.

The DAO: SEC report of investigation
In July 2017, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement released a report of
investigation regarding the question of whether the DAO, an
unincorporated organization created by Slock.it UG (Slock.it), a
German corporation, and its co-founders and intermediaries may have
violated U.S. federal securities laws.225 In this case, the SEC determined
not to pursue an enforcement action, but it did publish a valuable
opinion about securities regulation on the blockchain.226
The DAO was a “‘virtual’ organization embodied in computer code and
executed on a distributed ledger or blockchain,” created by Slock.it and
its co-founders in order to “create and hold a corpus of assets through the
sale of DAO tokens to investors” for the purpose of making profits.227
Based on the application of the Howey test and as detailed below, the SEC
determined in July 2017 that the DAO tokens were securities under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.228
In the spring of 2016, the DAO offered and sold 1.15 billion DAO
tokens in exchange for a total of approximately 12 million ETH.229
Holders of the DAO tokens were granted certain ownership and voting
rights in choosing a portfolio of investments to be held by the DAO,
via funded projects, which would serve as the underlying asset of the
DAO tokens and would grant its owners a return on their investment,
respectively.230 For a project to be included under the DAO’s portfolio,
a “contractor” needs to submit a proposal embedded in a smart
223. Id. at 846.
224. Id. at 853.
225. Report on Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 1 (July 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter Report on
Investigation].
226. Id. at 1.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 11 (applying the reasonable expectation of profits test).
229. Id. at 2–3.
230. Id. at 1.
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contract deployed on the blockchain and post details about the
proposal on the DAO website, providing a link to the source code.231
The prerequisites for submitting a proposal were ownership of at least
one DAO token and a secured deposit to be forfeited in case the
proposal failed to achieve a quorum of DAO token holders.232
Additionally, before a proposal would be brought to a vote, a group of
individuals appointed by Slock.it as “curators” have to review and
approve it. These appointed curators had the ultimate control as to
whether a project would be submitted for voting by DAO holders. The
first proposal to be funded was submitted by DAO’s co-founders, Slock.it.
In applying the Howey test to the DAO case, the SEC determined the
following:
(1) The term “issuer” is broadly defined to include unincorporated
organizations or persons, ruling that the term issuer is to be “flexibly
construed” in the context of § 5 as the “definition of a security itself
expands.”233
(2) Cryptocurrency is “money” for the purpose of the Howey test.
Exchanging DAO tokens for ETH is the “type of contribution of value
that can create an investment contract under Howey.”234
(3) The motivation of DAO purchasers was to make profits, as the
DAO was a for-profit entity, pooling ETH to fund projects, proposing
the sharing of profits from the returns of the funded projects.235
(4) The efforts of Slock.it’s co-founders and the DAO’s curators were
essential to the success of the DAO’s enterprise. The SEC report
explains that the “creators of the DAO held themselves out to investors
as experts in Ethereum, the blockchain protocol on which the DAO
operated, and told investors that they had selected persons to serve as
[c]urators based on their experience and credentials.” The first
proposal was put forth by Slock.it itself.236
The SEC stressed that Slock.it’s managerial efforts played a
significant role in the DAO’s success both during the offering and after

231. Id. at 6–7.
232. See id. at 7. ETH raised by the DAO was to be distributed to a contractor to
fund a proposal subject to a majority vote of DAO token holders. However, in order
to vote, DAO token holders had to tie up their tokens until the end of the voting cycle.
As a result, holders were incentivized to either to affirm the proposal in their votes or
to abstain from voting. Id.
233. Id. at 15.
234. Id. at 11.
235. Id. at 11–12.
236. Id. at 12.
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the enterprise launched, on an ongoing basis. During the offering, the
DAO’s protocols were “pre-determined by Slock.it and its cofounders,” specifying the powers to be granted to the curators.237 On
an ongoing basis following the launch, the expertise of the curators
and their identity “was critical in monitoring the operation of the
DAO, safeguarding investor funds, and determining whether
proposed contracts should be put for a vote.”238 Although DAO token
holders were afforded voting rights, the curators dictated the terms
and controlled the scheme of the vote, both by electing the projects
that would be brought to the vote, and because DAO token holders
had the incentive to either affirm the proposal or abstain from voting
due to the technical set-up of the voting process.239
The DAO did not meet the requirements of Regulation
Crowdfunding, adopted under TIII of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 because it was not a broker-dealer or a
funding portal registered with the SEC and the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA).240
B. The Case for Antifraud-Only Markets on the Blockchain
One major justification for securities regulation comes from the
need to protect the vulnerability of retail investors.241 However, if we
assume that the blockchain offering would be subject to verification of
the investor’s sophistication, will the market of blockchain offerings
effectively reward or penalize voluntary disclosure or its lack thereof?
Will other sufficient market mechanisms such as exchanges or other
private bodies assume this role? These are somewhat empirical
questions to be addressed in future research, documenting the virtual
setting of actual blockchain offerings. If the market is exclusively open
to sophisticated investors, it is likely that blockchain offerings will be
fairly priced given their voluntary disclosures and make investors
potentially better off compared to the regulatory universe of mandatory
disclosures. For offerings limited to sophisticated investors of securities
regimes, an anti-fraud only market providing liquidity similar to the
144(a) market resonates well with the nature of the blockchain.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
See Report on Investigation, supra note 225, at 4 n.11.
See Langevoort, supra note 15, at 1033.

2018]

CRYPTO SECURITIES

117

The purpose of Rule 144(a) is to provide a market for the sale of
privately placed securities that do not have and are not required to
have an SEC registration in place.242 Mandatory disclosure is generally
not required of corporations traded on the 144(a) private market, with
the exception of minimal identification such as company name and
the nature of its business.243 Within the 144(a) market, disclosure costs
are expected to be reduced, to some extent, and issuers are free of
corporate governance implications of securities laws, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements.244 Remarkably, the 144(a) experience
has shown that sophisticated investors demand disclosure
approximately the same as required by the SEC in the public market.245
The 144(a) market is thus a safe haven providing issuers and investors
with an unregulated trading platform, exempt from registration and
are only subject to anti-fraud rules.246 Within this private market, the
regulatory scrutiny of the SEC is focused only on fraudulent or
dishonest manipulation, although the limited scope of action does not
necessarily imply a limited enforcement policy. To the contrary, some
evidence suggests that the SEC has initiated more fraud investigations
against issues exempt from federal registration requirements than
against those that were registered.247
Parallel with the public market discussed below for investors of diverse
profiles, a private liquid market for sophisticated investors will allow
better flow of capital to finance innovation and entrepreneurship
without jeopardizing the protection of retail investors, while allowing
sophisticated investors to negotiate the information they need to assess
the offering and to monitor their investment’s performance on an
ongoing basis. Such a private market will provide blockchain issuers
with a choice of regulatory regimes, i.e., a market of informational
regulatory regimes. Setting multiple choices for blockchain offerings
provides a mechanism superior to a single regulator for ascertaining
242. See, e.g., Luis F. Moreno Treviño, Access to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Issuers:
Rule 144A Private Placements, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 159, 174 (1993) (examining the primary
purpose behind adopting Rule 144(a)).
243. See Sjostrom, supra note 14, at 435.
244. See id. at 436–37.
245. See Treviño, supra note 242, at 195 (contending that documentation under
Rule 144(a) is becoming a “standardized” practice); see also Howell E. Jackson & Eric
F. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in
1999—Part I, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 667 (2001).
246. See Sjostrom, supra note 14, at 422–23.
247. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J.
CORP. L. 1, 34–35 (1983).
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what information disclosure is in the investors’ best interests.248 A priori,
there is no reason to assume sophisticated investors are less proficient
than the SEC in setting the agenda for disclosure requirements. A
private market alongside the publicly regulated one will thus provide
both blockchain issuers and sophisticated investors with choices, while
also revealing investor preferences and thereby providing feedback to
regulators on the efficacy of the regulated market, and the nature and
type of information that should be subject to mandatory disclosure.
To assess whether sophisticated investors can be assumed to voice
their requirements and have sufficient resources to fend for
themselves, recall the nature of the embedded costs and risk factors on
the blockchain, identified above. Controlling costs and monitoring
costs on the blockchain are generally on par with embedded costs and
risk factors of traditional investment contracts available in 144(a)
private markets, i.e., the traditional core risks encountered by investors
in every corporation. Even the sources of systemic risks identified on
blockchain-based assets due to impaired transparency and contractual
rigidity or “stickiness” are prevalent in MBSs and CDOs, and are not
phenomena exclusive to the blockchain.249 If sophisticated investors
can be assumed to demand the information required to assess the
investment and to monitor its performance on an ongoing basis in
traditional 144(a) markets, then they should also have the requisite
decision making skills to fend for themselves when investing in
blockchain-based assets, whether personally or by delegating the task
to their representatives and advisors.
The standard of eligibility required to deem an investor as
sophisticated is also a subject of debate.250 Currently, the 144(a)
market is open only to qualified institutional buyers.251 Professor
Donald Langevoort suggests a thought experiment about why the
eligible investor criterion should not be altered to “comfortably
include high net worth individuals.”252 Extending Langevoort’s

248. Romano, supra note 15, at 393.
249. Judge, supra note 164, at 690.
250. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1083–84 (discussing different courts’
interpretations of what makes an investor sophisticated).
251. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2013). As defined in the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Rule 501 of Regulation D, a qualified institutional buyer (QIB)
owns and invests a minimum of $100 million in securities on a discretionary basis.
QIBs typically include savings and loans associations and banks, investment and
insurance companies, employee benefit plans, and hedge funds. Id.
252. Langevoort, supra note 15, at 1060.
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thought experiment, why not limit the anti-fraud only standard on
blockchain offerings to accredited investors only? Relaxing the
requirements of sophistication may resonate well with the libertarian
terrain of the blockchain, a market that is typically governed by
individual property owners rather than institutions.253
Langevoort mentions two more political hurdles for the development
of a private anti-fraud only liquid market.254 The first is the expected
political opposition for the private market by agents enjoying the
benefits of regulation. The SEC is likely to favor expansion of its
regulatory reach for reasons of “regulatory aggrandizement,” and the
“politically powerful public stock exchanges” are not expected to favor
the growth of private rivals into which large sums of money may
migrate.255 The second hurdle is the implicit political motivation to
police private power by means of securities regulation. Along with the
desire to protect investors, securities regulation “relates to the desire to
impose norms that we associate with public governmental
responsibility—accountability,
transparency,
openness,
and
256
This “administrative law-like”
deliberation” to corporate power.
approach to securities regulation is a key toolset for public governance
of private power in the traditional economy.257 The justification for
such administrative governance through securities regulation is
particularly salient for large corporations and for corporations
providing essential services, in particular to systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs) and to socially important non-financial
institutions (SINFIs).258 For these reasons, Langevoort concludes his
thought experiment reasoning that the SEC will eventually expand its
regulatory authority to the private marketplace as well.259
Crypto markets pose unique political constraints. First, a blockchainbased asset is a digital asset positioned on a virtual space and is thus
inherently global. Any effort to regulate transactions occurring on the
253. See infra note 312 and accompanying text (defining accredited investors); see
also Langevoort, supra note 15, at 1058 (criticizing the net worth standard requirement
and its lack of inflation update).
254. Langevoort, supra note 15, at 1059 (“First, securities sold pursuant to Rule
144A cannot be fungible with securities traded in a public market. Second, only
qualified institutional buyers . . . are currently eligible to participate as buyers.”).
255. Id. at 1066, 1069.
256. Id. at 1066.
257. See id. at 1066–67.
258. See generally Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Too Important to Fail: Bankruptcy Versus
Bailout of Socially Important Non-financial Institutions, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 159 (2017).
259. Langevoort, supra note 15, at 1069–70.
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blockchain raises questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.260 Among
other legal difficulties, “the SEC may not be able to effectively pursue
bad actors or recover funds.”261 Second, as of early 2018, the type of
business financed on the blockchain platforms is typically
entrepreneurial, with little political comparability with traditional public
sources of power.262 Third, the blockchain territory is politically
positioned as a libertarian safe haven detached from national
governments and their administrative agencies.263 At their core,
blockchain-based assets are providing a financial platform based on
computation power and mathematical proof, displacing traditional
reliance on states, regulators, exchanges, and intermediaries. As of early
2018, the market caps of crypto markets are perhaps not high enough
to pose a threat to traditional capital markets, and the intermediaries
that serve them. Yet, given the astounding growth rate in crypto
markets during 2016 and 2017, traditional regulatory agencies and
intermediaries should be concerned, and accordingly, have political
motivation to encourage regulation of the blockchain industry.
The political relationship between the regulatory apparatus of the
SEC and the blockchain territory encompasses some of the most
fundamental questions in international law and policy and in political
theory. These questions deal with the intersection between anarchy and
capitalism, globalization and the state, free markets and regulation, all
of which are beyond the scope of this paper. For our purpose here, it is
sufficient to note that trading on the blockchain and traditional 144(a)
markets is to a large extent comparable, and the properties of trading
on the blockchain by sophisticated investors merit similar protection by
securities regulators in applying their authority.
C. Proposed Doctrinal Improvements
As explained above, the Howey test for determining whether an
investment is protected under securities laws is based both on the

260. See Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 1303, 1319–20 (2014) (noting that Congress cannot independently create crossborder regulatory schemes because it would be an assertion of power beyond the
United States’s territorial borders).
261. Clayton, supra note 6.
262. See Cohney et al., supra note 96, at 5–6 (conducting an ICO survey and finding
that ICOs are primarily used for entrepreneurial business).
263. Adam Winfield, Blockchain: Libertarian, Authoritarian, or Somewhere In Between?,
FORBES (July 7, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2017/07/07/blockchainlibertarian-authoritarian-or-somewhere-in-between.
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purchasers’ motivation to earn profits, rather than consume products
or services, and on the dependency of the success of the contractual
enterprise on the efforts of others.264 Blockchain-based assets call into
question the rationality of this doctrine.
The first element of the Howey test, the motivational element, has
given rise to numerous contractual designs of “utility tokens,” a term
describing blockchain-based assets representing consumptive goods,
for the purpose of avoiding securities regulation.265 In the blockchain
territory, discerning consumptive from speculative aspirations is an
inherently impractical, vague, and redundant mission. First, all
purchasers of blockchain-based assets have a profit-oriented
motivation, without reservation. Even when the underlying value of
the blockchain-based asset is a consumptive good, there is often a
secondary market for tokens.266 Second, as the analysis of risk factors
above shows, blockchain-based assets with consumptive value are often
offered to investors in early development stages and incur significantly
higher monitoring costs. Purchasers of a blockchain-based asset with
a consumptive motivation are often more vulnerable than purchasers
with speculative profit motivations. Third, issuers are not wellpositioned to assess the purchasers’ motivation in the automated
trading environment of the blockchain. Issuers rarely meet their
investors in person and have little knowledge of their purchase
motivation. Requiring offerors of blockchain-based assets to conduct
a motivational assessment of their purchasers will inevitably trigger a
high degree of uncertainty over the blockchain industry.
The second element of the Howey test is an assessment of whether
purchasers relied on the efforts of others for success of the
enterprise.267 Blockchain-based assets again challenge the logic of this
test. Investors of blockchain-based assets are never positioned to
perform the contract on their own. Inevitably, they must rely on the
efforts of others on the blockchain’s ecosystem to bring their
investment to fruition. Yet, when these “others” are dispersed on a
decentralized ledger, securities regulation does not make sense, if only
for the technically implausible enforcement of mandatory disclosure
requirements on a decentralized ledger when no particular party is
positioned as the cheaper information gatherer. When purchasers rely

264.
265.
266.
267.

See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
For example, the SAFT project, see Batiz-Benet, supra note 9.
Hinman, supra note 110.
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99.
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on the efforts of a global community of very many others on a
decentralized ledger, none of these particular agents are able to carry
the costs of mandatory disclosure. Reliance on the efforts of others
should be narrowed to test whether a third party—be it a person, entity
or coordinated group of actors—drives the expectation of a return or has
the potential to exert a controlling cost on the blockchain-based investors.
Regulators should target the identified sources of risks and focus on
those risks that securities regulation can potentially mitigate.
Securities regulations are particularly useful in taming controlling risks
and monitoring risks, and they have some potential value in hedging
systemic risks. The potential benefits of applying securities regulations
are thus a function of the scope of controlling costs, monitoring costs
and potential systemic risks at the particular blockchain offering. The
higher the controlling and monitoring costs of the blockchain-based
investment contract, the higher the potential need of regulated
protection. On the other hand, the costs of regulation must be taken
into account and balanced against its benefits.
The costs of securities regulations should also be assessed because
regulation is inevitably costly. Application of securities regulations may
deter innovation and impede growth, inevitably increasing the costs of
funding innovation. Regulators are not technically trained and may
make a fortiori poorer decisions about the blockchain’s disclosure
equilibrium than those achieved by the free blockchain markets.
Regulators are themselves agents with self-interested motivations, and
thus can be influenced and directed by interest-group politics that may
draw on policy that is far from optimal from a societal perspective.268
Choosing to disclose a certain element might obscure other more
important information. Similarly, an adequate warning might be
rendered ineffective by inadequate formatting.269 It is not at all clear
what would be the causal relationship between enforcement of securities
laws on the blockchain space and blockchain frauds and misbehaviors,
and whether enforcement of securities laws on the blockchain offering
would enhance the public’s welfare given its overall costs.
This proposal is consistent with the Howey test’s results, albeit
contesting its rhetoric. Recall that investors in Howey incurred very

268. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1023, 1058 (2000).
269. Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 582 (2006).
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high controlling cost, and very high monitoring costs.270 Investors
relied on the management to cultivate the grove for them as they were
non-residents of Florida and had no technical expertise in cultivating
citrus groves.271 Yet, in the blockchain setting, the consumption
motivation often comes hand in hand with higher monitoring costs, as
the consumer value underlying the blockchain-based asset is off-chain
and thus cannot be verified automatically.272 Instead of assessing the
purchasers’ motivation, offerings of blockchain-based assets require a
structural assessment of costs to reveal investor vulnerabilities and
assess the regulatory potential to remedy.
D. Examples
1. Bitcoin
In 2008, the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto released a white paper
titled “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,” which introduced
the mechanisms underlying modern blockchains, and in particular the
decentralized consensus protocol based on proof-of-work.273 Shortly
afterwards, the same author released open source software implementing
these mechanisms, and started running this software themselves on the
Internet, thereby creating the Bitcoin blockchain.274
In the primary market, Bitcoin has never officially been offered to
investors.275 In the secondary market, its purchase is open to anyone,
worldwide, regardless of investor status or qualification, subject to the
“proof-of-work” requirement for block-rewards, which essentially
allocates the right to assign property rights in the blockchain based on
computational power.276 As of 2018, such computational power is

270. Howey, 328 U.S. at 296 (noting that the ten-year service contracts generally did not have
a cancellation option and gave the service provider “full and complete” possession of the grove).
271. Id.
272. For discussion of monitoring costs on blockchain-based assets, see supra Section II.B.
273. See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
(unpublished manuscript), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
274. See generally Bitcoin, LUNYR, https://lunyr.com/article/Bitcoin (last visited Oct.
17, 2018) (providing information about Bitcoin’s contributors, terminology, history,
and structure).
275. Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#what-aboutbitcoin-and-consumer-protection (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (explaining that one can
only acquire bitcoins (1) as payment for goods or services, (2) by purchasing Bitcoins
on an exchanges, (3) a direct transaction with someone near you, or (4) earning
bitcoins through mining).
276. See supra note 31 (defining proof-of-work).
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typically held by Bitcoin miners, who also decide which fork to follow
in case of disagreements about the blockchain’s rules.277
When assessing whether securities regulation should be applied to
Bitcoins, controlling costs, monitoring costs, and systemic costs should
be weighed against the costs of securities regulation.
First, to assess Bitcoin’s possible controlling costs, one should assess
whether any particular party is in a position to allocate new blocks or
authorize transactions.
Bitcoin’s blockchain employs a purely
automated mathematical process that is open to all, where the power
to allocate ownership in new blocks is allocated by computational
power to solve mathematical riddles. In 2018, most of this power is
held by miners, but their identity and power can shift with time.278
Indeed, Bitcoin’s founder, Satoshi Nakamoto, has not been active on
its blockchain since 2010, with no deleterious effect noticed on the
blockchain’s growth.279 By contrast, consider the expected effect of the
departure of a corporate founder in a traditional corporation to assess
the dramatic significance of decentralization. What would happen if
Mark Zuckerberg were to leave Facebook?
Some efforts to
institutionalize the Bitcoin community have evolved throughout the years,
but no such community has been granted the power to exert controlling
costs on the blockchain. For example, the “Bitcoin Foundation,”
established in 2012 as a nonprofit, has been funding some of the core
software developers of Bitcoin and has represented the cryptocurrency
with the U.S. government.280 “Coin Center,” established in 2014, has been
advocating Bitcoin to the U.S. government as a think tank.281 While many
parties contribute to the cryptocurrency’s growth and share its prophecy
and value, no particular entity is positioned to exert controlling costs on
the blockchain. Indeed, in June 2018, William Hinman, director of the
Division of Corporation Finance at the SEC announced that because
Bitcoin has been decentralized and operational for some time, imposing

277. See Bloomberg, This is What the Average Bitcoin Owner Looks Like, FORTUNE (Jan.
24, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/24/young-men-buying-bitcoin (noting a
survey found that nearly half of Bitcoin’s investors are minorities and more than 60
percent sit it as an investment).
278. See generally supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text (discussing how initially
agents with “mining farms” prosper in the process of bidding for new blocks).
279. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 171.
280. Marketing & Operations Plan 2018, BITCOIN FOUND. (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://bitcoinfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/MarkOps-Strategy2018-V1.1.1-compressed.pdf.
281. About Us, COIN CENTER, https://coincenter.org/about (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
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“the disclosure regime of the federal securities laws to the offer and resale
of Bitcoin would seem to add little value.”282
Second, to assess the monitoring costs of the investment contract
required in Bitcoin, we must assess whether the value of the token is offchain or on-chain, meaning whether the blockchain technology offers
an automated verification process for the underlying value exchange
forming the transaction. In Bitcoin, the value is intrinsic to the token
itself and can be verified automatically. The value of the blockchain unit
is generally a function of computation processes and transactions
occurring within the ledger, leading to low monitoring costs.
Third, an assessment of systemic risks is required. The acceleration
in Bitcoin value has led many to label it as an asset bubble.283 But
beyond its accelerated value, Bitcoin has limited interconnectivity with
other segments of the economy, and as of early 2018, its possible failure
is unlikely to pose a threat on the real economy.284 In December 2017,
the economist Jushua Gans posted a postmortem of Bitcoin analyzing
the “Bitcoin bubble” “ahead of the game.”285 Gans suggests that
Bitcoin has “no fundamentals other than the system itself,” and Bitcoin
is at risk if “the whole apparatus . . . comes down perhaps from an
attack or some other technical failure.”286 Furthermore, a massive sale
by a major holder could trigger a market wide panic. Because Bitcoin
wallets are technically transparent, the identity of Bitcoin holders is
known and can be traced. For example, the Winklevoss twins are wellknown for their significant Bitcoin exposure.287 Yet Gans also points to
significant differences from previously known bubbles, which include
the global spread of holdings, the digital only trading space, the low
trading volumes and the lack of correlation to the real economy.288
Gans notes that “[u]nlike a stock market or junk bond crash, if bitcoin
282. Hinman, supra note 110.
283. See supra Section III.E.
284. See, e.g., Preeti Varathan, Most Exonomosts Think Bitcoin Won’t Bring Down the
Global Economy—Yet, QUARTZ (Dec. 26, 2017), https://qz.com/1165698/mosteconomists-think-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies-arent-dangerous-survey-says
(explaining that “most leading European economists believe there’s little reason to
worry” about the “Bitcoin bubble”).
285. Joshua Gans, The Bitcoin Bubble Post Mortem, DIGITOPOLY (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://digitopoly.org/2017/12/08/the-bitcoin-bubble-post-mortum.
286. Id.
287. See generally Nathaniel Popper, How the Winklevoss Twins Found Vindication in a
Bitcoin Fortune, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/
19/technology/bitcoin-winklevoss-twins.html.
288. Gans, supra note 285.
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goes down, there are no investments that are curtailed except for the
mining operations that underpin the system of course.”289
To summarize, securities regulation is not an appropriate legal
instrument for protecting investors in Bitcoin. Bitcoin has no
controlling costs and no monitoring costs, and as of early 2018, it
imposes meager systemic risks. On the other hand, attempting to
apply securities regulation on Bitcoin would incur heavy costs to the
emergence of entrepreneurial platforms and impede innovation that
could support economic growth. In addition, securities regulations of
Bitcoin would be impractical given the lack of any particular agent
positioned as a cheap information provider who could carry the costs
of mandatory disclosure. Yet, the Howey test would pass Bitcoin as a
security with flying colors, as all of its investors aim to profit, and rely
on the efforts of others for that process. In Bitcoin, these others are
miners on a dispersed platform, exhibiting very low controlling and
monitoring costs, suggesting mandatory disclosure afforded by
securities laws may not be an appropriate remedy.
2.

Tezos
In July 2017, Tezos raised in an ICO 65,627 BTC and 361,122 ETH
(worth together $232 million USD at the closure).290 The ICO was legally
designed as a fundraiser, where investors were making non-refundable
donations to the Tezos foundation, a corporation seeking (but not yet
granted) non-profit status in Switzerland.291 Tezos’s ICO was open to all
investor types as a public offering and was promoted in YouTube videos,292
a Facebook page,293 and on its website,294 without discrimination.
Assessing whether securities regulation should be applied to Tezos
requires, per the suggested proposal, evaluation of the controlling
costs, monitoring costs, and systemic risks of investments in Tezos, to
be weighed against the costs of securities regulation of its blockchain.
Consider first Tezos’s controlling costs. The proceeds of Tezos’s ICO

289. Id.
290. Stan Higgins, $232 Million: Tezos Blockchain Project Finishes Record-Setting Token
Sale, COINDESK (July 13, 2017, 10:36 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/232-milliontezos-blockchain-record-setting-token-sale.
291. See generally id.
292. Tezos, Tezos, An Explainer Video, YOUTUBE (May 9, 2017), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=7m7EU4JWI88.
293. Tezos Foundation, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/tezosledger (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
294. TEZOS, https://tezos.com/resources (including resources on how to invest).

2018]

CRYPTO SECURITIES

127

were collected by the Tezos Foundation, established in Switzerland a
few months preceding the ICO in April 2017.295 According to a
“Transparency Memo” posted on Tezos’s website, the Tezos
Foundation has contracted with Dynamic Ledger Solutions, Inc. (DLS)
a U.S.-based company currently controlled by its founders, Kathleen &
Arthur Breitman, to purchase “all of the Tezos-related intellectual
property (IP), including the source code of the Tezos cryptographic
ledger, logos, and trademark applications associated with the name
Tezos, domain names, and goodwill arising from a set of a relationships
with several contractors and potential customers in the financial
technology market” in consideration for payments made to DLS’s
shareholders, including 8.5 percent of the contributions made during
the fundraiser and a ten percent allocation of the tokens in the genesis
block, subject the terms of the transaction.296 In the aftermath of the
ICO closure and in light of the class actions filed against the Tezos
Foundation and DLS, allegations were made suggesting additional
controlling costs collected by DLS shareholders, including requested
coverage of legal expenses related to the lawsuits.297 The disclosure on
Tezos’s “Transparency Memo” should have sufficed to establish private
benefits and a material potential for self-dealing between DLS
shareholders and the Tezos blockchain project, based on the position
of DLS shareholders as owners of the source code.298
Monitoring costs at Tezos are also profound. Per Tezos’s “Contribution
Terms” posted on its website, investments in Tezos are “non-refundable”
and should be considered “contributions” rather than “investments.”299
Remarkably, neither Tezos Foundation nor DLS are contractually obliged
to provide purchasers with the tokens. The Contribution Terms explicitly
state that the project “could be fully or partially abandoned,” and its
295. See generally History, TEZOS FOUND., https://tezos.foundation/history (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
296. Tezos ICO Transparency Memo, STEEMIT, https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/
@roshania/tezos-ico-transparency-memo (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
297. Steve Stecklow et al., Exclusive: Tezos Founders Push for Legal Bailout from Swiss
Foundation, REUTERS (Dec.1, 2017, 6:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usbitcoin-tezos-lawsuits-exclusive/exclusive-tezos-founders-push-for-legal-bailout-fromswiss-foundation-idUSKBN1DV4K0.
298. Anna Irrera et al., Special Report: Backroom Battle Imperils $230 Million
Cryptocurrency Venture, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2017, 6:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-bitcoin-funding-tezos-specialreport/special-report-backroom-battleimperils-230-million-cryptocurrency-venture-idUSKBN1CN35K.
299. Contribution Terms, TEZOS, http://www.tezos.ch/pages/contribution-terms.html
(on file with American University Law Review).
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network and tokens not developed.300 No mechanisms for external audit
or milestones for monitoring the development of the network were
specified in the contribution documents, and indeed, according to the
media, Tezos has used the proceeds of its ICO to invest in stocks, bonds,
and precious metals, not to hire engineers and code developers, an
unusual pattern for a startup company.301
Systemic risks are hard to quantify. Investments in Tezos were likely
made by investors who had limited ability to trace the sources
underlying their investment and potentially producing its cash flow.
Investments in such an elusive setting conducted in the enthusiastic
market of blockchain issuances of 2017 are prone to inflating the asset
bubble where prices skew regardless of fundamentals. The nonrefundable nature of the transaction adds to the “stickiness” when no
contractual alterations are technically possible.
To summarize, securities regulation is an appropriate legal
instrument for Tezos.
The public offering incurs significant
controlling costs and monitoring costs, and imposes a substantial
systemic risk. The purpose of securities regulation is well suited to the
case of Tezos and mandatory disclosure is an adequate instrument to
mitigate the controlling and monitoring costs of the offering.
3.

Filecoin
Filecoin is a blockchain data storage network that has completed its
ICO, raising more than $257 million in September 2017.302 As with
Bitcoin, Filecoin miners compete to mine blocks. Yet in Filecoin,
tokens represent actual data storage space. Miners compete not only
to allocate tokens in the new block per se, but “to amass as much
storage as they can, and rent it out to clients.”303 Filecoin mining power
is proportional to active storage space on a cloud, which directly
provides a useful service to clients.304

300. Id.
301. Oscar Williams-Grut, What Does a Tech Startup do After Raising $232 Million Selling
Digital Coins to Investors? Set up a VC Fund, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2017, 3:05 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/tezos-launching-vc-fund-investing-stocks-bonds-ico-2017-8.
302. Filecoin, COINLIST, https://coinlist.co/filecoin (last visited Oct. 17, 2018)
(noting that most of the proceeds were in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ether).
303. FILECOIN WHITEPAPER, FILECOIN: A DECENTRALIZED STORAGE NETWORK 1 (July
19, 2017), https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf.
304. See generally, Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network, FILECOIN (July 19, 2017),
https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf.

2018]

CRYPTO SECURITIES

129

Despite the allusion to public offerings with the title “ICO,” Filecoin’s
offering was legally designed as a private placement, both in the initial
offering stage and on the ongoing trade in secondary markets.305 The
initial offering of Filecoin was exclusively open to accredited investors.306
Investments in Filecoin had several prerequisites, including creation of
a Coinlist account, verification of identity as a US accredited investor,
and submission of details required for “Know Your Customer/AntiMoney Laundering” requirements.307 The ongoing allocation of tokens
in the secondary market is decentralized. Miners get paid for fulfilling
storage requests on the Filecoin market.308 As the analysis above shows,
exchange platforms exist in traditional 144(a) markets on an anti-fraud
only basis, allowing for a liquid market of private securities with reduced
regulatory burden for qualified investors.309
There are strong
justifications to extend such regulatory patterns for private blockchain
offerings so as to reduce the heavy costs of mandatory disclosure
required by securities regulation and to create a market of regulatory
alternatives for issuers and investors on the blockchain territory. Per the
suggested roadmap, private placements of blockchains should be
subject to a quasi-144(a) anti-fraud only requirement. However, to be
thorough, this Article will proceed to analyze and assess controlling
costs, monitoring costs and systemic risk of the Filecoin offering.

305. See Confidential Private Placement Offering Memorandum: Purchase Rights for Tokens
Pursuant to Simple Agreement for Future Tokens, COINLIST, https://coinlist.co/
assets/index/filecoin_index/Protocol%20Labs%20-%20SAFT%20-%20Private%20Pl
acement%20Memorandum-bbd65da01fdc4a15219c49ad20fb9e28681adec9fae744c41
cccd124545c4c73.pdf (highlighting the initial requirement that each investor
complete a questionnaire proving it is an “accredited investor” for the purposes of the
securities laws in order to be eligible to participate in the token sale).
306. See FILECOIN, FILECOIN TOKEN SALE ECONOMICS 2, https://coinlist.co
/assets/index/filecoin_index/Filecoin-Sale-Economics-e3f703f8cd5f644aecd7ae3860
ce932064ce014dd60de115d67ff1e9047ffa8e.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (“We are
unfortunately legally restricted to involve only accredited investors (world-wide
investors accredited to [U.S.] standards or similar . . . .”).
307. How to Invest in Filecoin, COINLIST https://coinlist.co/assets/index/fi
lecoin_index/How-to-Invest-184a457c99ebf65a45abc72c523ad70e06d3814709d408d9
3714003128817e64.pdf.
308. Filecoin can be thought of a as a platform for trading in storage space. Filecoin
purchasers spend Filecoin hiring miners to store or distribute data. “As with Bitcoin,
Filecoin miners compete to mine blocks with sizable rewards, but Filecoin mining
power is proportional to active storage, which directly provides a useful service to
clients (unlike Bitcoin mining, whose usefulness is limited to maintaining blockchain
consensus).” Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network, supra note 304.
309. See generally supra Section IV.B.
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Analysis of controlling costs, monitoring costs and systemic risks of
the Filecoin blockchain offering yields an eclectic pattern. Controlling
costs should be separately assessed in the initial offering stage and on
an ongoing basis. In the initial offering, distribution of tokens was
criticized for an alleged bias giving private benefits to insiders and
entrepreneurs.310 In the secondary market, the decentralized pattern
of mining and its storage capacity requirement seem to substantially
limit opportunities for tunneling and self-dealing. Monitoring costs
are to be tamed in Filecoin by its automated verification process of the
underlying value of the blockchain offering.311 Recall that Filecoin is
a centralized storage network in which tokens represent respective
storage capacities. Although the underlying value of the token is
indeed off-chain, the automated process provided by its code allows for
a clear, fast, and accurate verification process of the storage space
provided. Filecoin is a good example for saving the costs of monitoring
by an intermediary as the storage space it secures is a technical feature
that can be automatically verified by the blockchain. Finally, systemic
risk should be assessed. The inaccurate pricing is indeed less of a
concern when all investors are sophisticated, especially when value of
tokens is entrenched in viable storage space granted to token holders.
Notably, applying the Howey test on Filecoin would yield a distorted
outcome. To be sure, investors of Filecoin had motivation to profit and
relied on the efforts of others. But the Howey test does not take into
account the low monitoring costs afforded by the blockchain’s automatic
verification process, or the dispersed mining process and its role in
sustaining the blockchain-based assets, applying securities laws when they
offer little remedy attuned to the identified risks investors face.
E. Alternative Regulatory Baskets
Subsidizing the production of information regarding blockchainbased assets will not necessarily address all the regulatory concerns
posed by the changing technological investment environment.
Indeed, analysis of the core costs and risk factors detailed above, which
could potentially serve to justify additional regulatory instruments, is
beyond the scope of this paper. Regulators may address risks

310. Stefano Bernardi, The Analysis Filecoin Doesn’t Want You to Read: Digging into the
Dynamics of Filecoin’s Token Sale and Economy, TOKENECONOMY (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://tokeneconomy.co/the-analysis-filecoin-doesnt-want-you-to-read-e60d5243 f17c.
311. See generally FILECOIN WHITEPAPER, supra note 303.
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stemming from the blockchain with other legal instruments, whether
supplementing securities laws or as alternative regulatory baskets.
1.

Private placements
Not all security offerings require registration and extensive
disclosure. Various exemptions to securities laws apply, where in
general, investors of sufficient means are considered sophisticated
enough to fend for themselves, whether personally or indirectly with
the assistance of advisors and wealth managers. Accredited investors
are generally institutions as well as individuals who earn over $200,000
in annual income (or $300,000 jointly, with a spouse) or have a net
worth, not including their primary residence, of over $1 million.312
Originally, securities laws required that the qualification of an investor
as accredited would be done prior to any marketing and solicitation
efforts, with the burden to verify the investor as accredited on the
issuer.313 However, with the JOBs Act,314 entrepreneurs can now solicit
more aggressively, as well as advertise and post offerings on their
websites, without prequalification and as long as they certify the
purchaser’s accredited status at the back end.315
The problem with private offerings is the lack of liquidity in the
secondary market. To address this problem, the SEC adopted Rule
144(a), which allows qualified institutional buyers (but not all accredited
investors) to trade among themselves and sell freely within the secondary
market, as long as the buyer is another qualified institutional investor and
is subject only to anti-fraud requirements.316 The private placement
market has grown substantially in recent years. To illustrate, as of 2015,
amounts raised through unregistered securities offerings have outpaced

312. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2014). This definition has been heavily criticized as it
has not been updated with inflation, effectively bringing a wide circle of households
into the exemption. Langevoort, supra note 15, at 1058.
313. § 230.506(c). Rule 506(c) was mandated by § 201(a) of the JOBS Act. See
Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9354,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2012/33-9354.pdf.
314. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
315. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL
STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 122–23, 125–27 (2016).
316. Sjostrom, supra note 14, at 422.
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the level of capital formation through registered securities offerings, and
totaled more than $2 trillion during 2014 alone.317
2.

Crowdfunding
Entrepreneurs can also raise capital from retail investors who do not
qualify as accredited investors by way of crowdfunding.318 Historically,
with striking similarity to ICOs offering “utility tokens,” crowdfunding
was popularized by web platforms such as Kickstarter as a means to
bypass the securities laws with returns distributed to investors in assets
or other rewards, such as free T-shirts.319 Utilizing the distinction
between consumers and investors based on purchaser motivation
allows the issuer to bypass securities laws, as consumers are merely
protected per their contractual rights, while investors enjoy extensive
protection of securities laws and the SEC. Crowdfunding was justified
as an exemption to the securities laws based on the potential
protection offered by the “‘wisdom’ of the crowd,” as crowdfunding
platforms allow for open discussion between issuers and investors, a
deliberative process of communication which is considered a substitute
to regulatory monitoring.320
Yet, while raising capital on the blockchain is legally ambiguous and
subject to regulatory uncertainty and is somewhat of a “no-mans’ land,”
raising capital in crowdfunding is subject to particular legal restrictions.
First, crowdfunding laws limit the amount that may be raised.
Crowdfunding is limited to a maximum aggregate amount of $1,070,000
in a twelve month period.321 Second, crowdfunding laws set limits on
how much an investor could risk, based on income and net worth (in
general, no more than $2200 USD or 5 percent of income or net worth,

317. Scott Bauguess et al., Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for
Unregistered Securities Offerings, 2009–2014 (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
dera/staff-papers/white-papers/30oct15_white_unregistered_offering.html.
318. See, e.g., § 227.100.
319. See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 16–20 (2012); Joan McLeod Heminway & Sheldon Hoffman,
Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879,
896 (2011); Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusionary Exemption, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283 (2014).
320. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 315, at 127.
321. See Inflation Adjustments and Other Technical Amendments Under Titles I
and III of the JOBS Act, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-10332 & 34-80355 (Mar. 31,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2017/33-10332.pdf.
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if they are under $107,000 USD).322 Third, funding portals are bestowed
with monitoring obligations including enforcement of disclosure duties
of issuers and supervision of investor profile compliance regarding the
investor’s education and qualifications. Funding portals are subject to a
registration requirement and are legally liable for negligent
misrepresentations in crowdfunding.323
3.

Contract and consumer protection
If securities laws do not apply, the default regulatory basket governing
offerings of blockchain units is contract and consumer protection. ICOs
or other blockchain offerings are currently unregulated as compared to
securities and are not required to have transparency in plans, offering
memoranda, and “white papers,” and are generally subject to freedom
of commercial speech. Offerors can choose what they disclose and the
medium and method of disclosure.324 The main doctrinal vehicle is
perhaps the unconscionability doctrine,325 which has been used to police
contracts between consumers and corporations based on flawed
bargaining procedure and the doctrine of unilateral mistakes.
However, contract law is both doctrinally outdated and institutionally
ill-suited to govern transactions on the blockchain. Contractual
enforcement and specific performance are not pertinent to the
blockchain territory, as all contracts are automatically enforced.
Traditional contractual remedies such as money damages, restitution,
rescission, and reformation are hardly realistic when the parties to the
transaction are global node users with heterogeneous investor profiles,
often obscured under anonymous identities using privacy preserving
trading platforms. In addition, courts are ill-positioned to regulate the
risks of blockchain units. Their ex post intervention is not sufficiently
timely nor based on the availability of participating plaintiffs. The facts
provided to the court in any single particular case would rarely suffice to
322. Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (May 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomp
lianceguide-051316.htm.
323. Securities Act § 4(a)(1) requires that each intermediary in a crowdfunding
transaction be registered with the Commission either as a broker-dealer or a funding portal.
Broker-dealers register with the SEC on existing Form BD using FINRA’s CRD system,
whereas funding portals register on new Form Funding Portal through the SEC’s Electronic
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. Funding portals may begin
registering with the SEC on new Form Funding Portal beginning on January 29, 2016.
324. See ICO, supra note 61.
325. See generally Clinton A. Stuntebeck, Comment, 19 ME. L. REV. 81, 85 (1967)
(explaining the doctrine of unconscionability’s place within contract law).
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resolve a blockchain litigated case. Norms and industry standards require
broader understanding of the unique and almost peculiar dynamics of
the crypto markets. In addition, courts usually lack the requisite technical
expertise for understanding and assessing the language of blockchain
transactions, which is embedded in code. Courts applying common law
on a case-by-case basis are thus institutionally incompetent and, compared
with regulators or with the legislature, are at an institutional disadvantage
to address blockchain transactions.326
Some ex ante regulation of blockchain offerings may be provided by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Consumer protection and
prevention of unfair and deceptive acts and practices are the hallmark
of the FTC’s mandate,327 and could potentially be regulated by the
FTC.
While as of early 2018, no such regulation has been
promulgated, the FTC has turned its attention to blockchain
technology and its potential consumer protection implications, and
has held several discussions and forums on the subject.328 In the most
recent panel held by the FTC in March 2017, panelists concluded “that it is
difficult to determine the scope of the consumer protection risks posed by
blockchain technology because it is in a very early stage of development.”329
However, blockchain regulation by the FTC could be forthcoming.
4.

Financial services and money services laws
The risks posed by blockchain offerings may also be addressed by
financial services and money services law, raising questions of
jurisdictional authority between federal and state regulators and between
different federal agencies relating to transactions on a blockchain. For
example, crypto-securities designated as virtual currencies are sometimes
subject to regulation by the Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes
and Enforcement Network (FinCEN) as money service businesses

326. For similar arguments for the more general case of consumer protection, see
generally Craswell, supra note 269, at 592–93; Lewis A. Kornhauser, Comment,
Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1151–52 (1976).
327. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
328. See FinTech Forum: Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Mar. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2017/
03/fintech-forum-blockchain-artificial-intelligence (announcing the DTC’s third
FinTech Forum).
329. Kari S. Larsen, Federal Trade Commission Considers the Implications of AI and
Blockchain Technologies, REEDSMITH (Mar. 15, 2017) https://www.reedsmith.com/
en/perspectives/2017/03/federal-trade-commission-considers-the-implication.
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(MSB).330 Regulation of MSB is generally designed to protect consumers
in financial transactions, and includes anti-laundering provisions,
minimum capital requirements and licensing.
FinCEN regulation applies to some blockchain transactions defined
as “virtual currencies,” a medium of exchange that operates “like a
currency in some environments but . . . does not have legal tender status
in any jurisdiction,” depending on whether they run on a centralized or
decentralized platform.331 MSB and money transmitters include
administrators and exchangers of virtual currency and administrators of
centralized repositories of virtual currencies.332 However, a person who
creates units of decentralized convertible virtual currency that has no
central repository and no single administrator, which “persons may
obtain by their own computing or manufacturing effort,” is not subject
to regulation as a money transmitter.333
Recently, the CFTC has asserted jurisdiction over the regulation of virtual
currencies as “commodities” under the Commodity Exchange Act.334 In
October 2017, the CFTC released a report determining that virtual tokens
may be commodities or derivatives contracts depending on the particular
facts and circumstances.335 In 2018, a New York district court judge granted
the CFTC an injunctive relief, ruling that material misrepresentation and
misappropriation of customer funds in contracts of sale of virtual
currencies is a fraudulent act with commodities in interstate commerce
covered under the CFTC’s broad anti-fraud authority.336

330. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff) (2017) (stating that a money service business is a
person doing business in the United States in one of the listed capacities).
331. Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administrating, Exchanging, or Using
OF
TREASURY
(Mar.
18,
2013),
Virtual
Currencies,
DEP’T
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See CTFC Backgrounder on Oversight of and Approach to Virtual Currency Futures
Markets, CFTC OFF. OF PUB. AFF. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/
default/files/idc/groups/public/%40customerprotection/documents/file/backgro
under_virtualcurrency01.pdf; Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(9) (2012)
(defining “commodity” as including “all services, rights, and interests . . . in which
contracts for future deliver are presently or in the future dealt in”).
335. A CFTC Primer on Virtual Currencies, LAB CFTC (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.
cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/file/labcftc_primercurrencies100417.pdf.
336. See CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 229–30 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
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5.

State laws
Crypto securities have also received the attention of state legislators.
One prominent example is the State of New York, whose Department
of Financial Services (NYDFS) has issued rules and regulations dealing
with virtual currencies.337 In particular, NYDFS BitLicense regulation
requires obtaining a license as a condition of any of the following
activities involving New York or a New York Resident, including
(1) receiving virtual currency, (2) storing or maintaining custody or
control of virtual currency, (3) buying or selling virtual currency,
(4) performing exchange services as a customer business, or
(5) controlling, administrating or issuing virtual currency.338 As part
of its licensing requirements, New York requires periodic disclosure to
NYDFS regulators about ownership, finances, and insurance, as well as
the maintenance of a financial reserve, a quasi-equity cushion the
amount of which is based on various factors.339
Other state regulators intervened in token offerings as well. “Texas
was the first state to issue an administrative order on cryptocurrency
investments.”340 The Texas Securities Commissioner recently issued
two Emergency Cease and Desist orders, first, in December 2017,
against USI-Tech Limited, a Dubai-based firm selling investments tied
to Bitcoin mining, and second, in January 2018, to the blockchainbased financial system startup BitConnect to cancel a token offering
soliciting its investors by claiming to deliver a 100 percent annual
return or more.341 The orders cited “sales agents” targeting Texas
residents, as well as residents of other states, “through websites, social
media, and online marketplaces like craigslist.”342 Other states may
naturally follow, potentially reviving the state-based regulatory
competition by establishing a market for crypto-investment law.

337. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200 (2015).
338. Id.; BitLicense Regulatory Framework, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., http://www.dfs
.ny.gov/legal/regulations/bitlicense_reg_framework.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
339. See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23 § 200.8 (2015) (capital
requirements); id. § 200.14 (reports and financial disclosures).
340. $4 Billion Crypto-Promoter Ordered to Halt Fraudulent Sales, TEX. ST. SEC. BD. (Jan. 4,
2018), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/4-billion-crypto-promoter-orde
red-halt-fraudulent-sales.
341. Id.
342. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Blockchain technology has radically changed innovation funding.
Regulators, scholars, judges, investors, and industry players have yet to
fully understand this emerging technology and how to potentially
regulate it. What is clear is that we lack a structural analysis of the
blockchain territory and its technical and economic properties, a
perquisite for developing a common language for the establishment of
blockchain investments laws to govern the emerging crypto-markets.
This Article offers the first comprehensive account for such analysis.
This Article addresses the challenges in protecting investors within this
new territory through the lens of securities regulation, providing a
systematic analysis of the embedded costs and risk factors of blockchainbased assets, showing that crypto-markets differ materially from traditional
capital markets and impose unique controlling, monitoring and
technological risk factors. The new investor interface on the blockchain is
highly heterogeneous, suggesting that legal deconstruction of the
blockchain transaction is required in order to assess whether and when
securities regulation is required to protect investors of the identified risks.
Regulators should target their resources in blockchain-based assets
that impose types of risks that securities regulation can potentially
mitigate. Beyond the practical guidance for securities regulation of
the blockchain territory, the analysis sheds light on core questions in
securities laws, including their purpose, the breadth of their
application in different types of markets, and their exclusivity as a
regulatory monopoly.

